Reisinger_final_cpcxns.doc

2/25/2010 3:06:50 PM

ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT AND THE
LIMITS OF COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM:
WILL COURTS ALLOW CITIZEN SUITS TO
PICK UP THE SLACK?
WILL REISINGER*
TRENT A. DOUGHERTY**
NOLAN MOSER***
INTRODUCTION
Using its expansive power to regulate interstate commerce,
1
Congress has enacted numerous environmental laws since the 1970s.
These major statutes include the Clean Water Act (CWA), the Clean
Air Act (CAA), and the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation
Act (SMCRA), each of which established national standards for
2
environmental protection for the first time ever. These laws establish
national requirements for the discharge of pollutants into navigable
waterways; set standards for the construction of new coal-fired power
plants; and require coal mining companies to properly clean up
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1. The Supreme Court has said that although Congress’ authority to regulate comes from
the Commerce Clause, environmental statutes “offer States the choice of regulating that activity
according to federal standards or having state law pre-empted by federal regulation.” New
York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992).
2. For simplicity, this article will principally reference these three major statutes, although
the enforcement mechanisms and citizen suit provisions in most federal environmental laws are
similar.

1
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abandoned mine sites. They ensure that uniform standards for
4
pollution control are in place throughout the country.
These statutes were revolutionary not only because they
recognized a federal role in environmental protection for the first
time ever, but also because of the enforcement mechanisms they
established. First, these laws envision a structure of “cooperative
federalism” whereby the federal government and the states share in
5
the regulatory and enforcement burden. Under this cooperative
approach, states may draft and implement their own programs to
comply with the laws and consequently must share enforcement
6
obligations with the federal government.
Second, while Congress intended federal and state agencies to
hold primary enforcement responsibilities, legislators also included
provisions allowing private citizens to enforce the laws when the
government was unwilling or unable to do so. These so-called
“citizen suit” provisions, included in every major environmental law,
7
allow “citizen attorneys general” to sue violators in federal court.
Congress intended citizen suits to supplement government action, to
make up the balance of necessary enforcement at times when underfunded or over-worked agencies could not ensure that all laws are
8
complied with.

3. Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 (SMCRA) § 102(f), 30 U.S.C. §
1202(f) (2006); Clean Water Act (CWA) § 101(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2006); Clean Air Act
(CAA) § 111, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (2006).
4. Id.
5. See infra Part I.A.
6. Federal regulations establish national standards, but individual states (or Indian tribes)
may implement their own programs and gain the primary authority and responsibility to enforce
the law. For example, to date 46 states have CWA implementation programs that have been
approved by the federal EPA. See U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, NPDES State Program Status,
http://cfpub.epa.gov/npdes/statestats.cfm (last visited Nov. 8, 2009).
7. All federal environmental statutes, with the exception of the Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), contain citizen suit provisions. See, e.g., Toxic
Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2619 (2006); SMCRA, 30 U.S.C. § 1270 (2006); CWA, 33
U.S.C. § 1365 (2006); Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. §
1415(g)(1) (2006); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300j–8 (2006); Noise Control Act of
1972, 42 U.S.C. § 4911 (2006); Energy Policy and Conservation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6305 (2006);
Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (2006); CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (2006);
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980
(CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9659 (2006); Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C.
§ 8435 (2006); Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. §
11046(a)(1) (2006); Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1349 (2006).
8. Congress intended citizen suits to supplement agency enforcement, to “protect against
the omnipresent danger of a state shirking its enforcement responsibilities.” Student Pub.
Interest Research Group v. AT&T Bell Labs., 617 F. Supp. 1190, 1198 (D.N.J. 1985).
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Indeed, today is just such a time. The cooperative framework,
which presupposes diligent and uniform state regulation, has broken
down. State and federal enforcement budgets are being slashed,
reducing government oversight and potentially allowing more
9
violations of law to go unpunished.
Moreover, political
considerations—including interstate competition and pressure from
industry to minimize regulation—threaten to further compromise the
states’ ability to enforce the laws. As government enforcement
becomes increasingly less reliable, citizen enforcement of
environmental law is more necessary than ever.
But as this article explains, citizen enforcement is increasingly
difficult. Citizen litigants face mounting legal obstacles that impede
their access to the courts, potentially depriving them of their
important role as private attorneys general. For example, recent
Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence threatens to prohibit citizens
groups from suing state officials for their failure to enforce state
10
environmental implementation plans.
The Supreme Court’s
standing jurisprudence, moreover, restricts many meritorious claims
11
from reaching federal court.
The goal of this article is to answer several questions, the
fundamental question being: in an era when state and federal
government enforcement of the laws is increasingly unreliable, will
citizen suits be able to pick up the slack? That is, will citizen
enforcement of environmental law be able to adequately complement
and supplement government enforcement, as Congress intended, so
that all laws are complied with? And to this end, what legal and
legislative changes can be made to ensure that citizen suits can fully
compensate for any decreases in government action?
To answer these questions, Part I of this article begins with a
brief and unprejudiced overview of cooperative federalism, the
enforcement regime envisioned by Congress whereby the federal
government, states, and citizens share responsibility to ensure
compliance with the laws. This part concludes with a discussion of
the structure and legislative history of the Clean Air Act’s citizen suit

9. See Part II for examples of how reductions in agency enforcement funding at the state
and federal level are already affecting the enforcement of environmental laws.
10. See infra Part III.C.
11. See infra Part III.B.
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provision as evidence that Congress intended citizen action to form
12
the “essential backbone” of environmental protection.
In Part II, we examine the disadvantages of cooperative
federalism, providing a sharp critique of the decentralized regulatory
model. A decentralized approach to environmental protection, we
argue, cannot fully enforce environmental laws. We discuss the
inherent flaws in a decentralized enforcement model and also
reference current challenges that inhibit vigorous state and federal
enforcement. For example, budget shortfalls and political resistance
to regulation in individual states result in disparate enforcement of
national environmental standards. The problems we outline in this
section reinforce our argument that citizen suits are essential to
ensure compliance with environmental laws.
Building on the importance of active and vigilant citizen
attorneys general, Part III explains the obstacles standing in the way
of these potential public interest litigants. We attempt to “shine the
light” on several emerging court-created barriers that currently
prevent or discourage citizen enforcement of environmental law.
First, this part illustrates how recent Eleventh Amendment and
standing jurisprudence has precluded citizen suits and will continue to
do so unless addressed. Next this part describes how the judicial
interpretation of “diligent prosecution” and fee shifting provisions
discourages and impedes citizen action.
Finally, Part IV proposes relatively simple legislative changes as
a way to maximize the public’s ability to enforce environmental laws
by reducing the court-created barriers and disincentives to citizen
action.
We suggest a comprehensive legislative solution—the
enactment of an “Omnibus Environmental Enforcement Act”—as a
means to facilitate public enforcement of environmental laws. The
draft legislation that we propose has several goals. Among other
things, it 1) addresses citizen standing by creating a new standing
paradigm for environmental plaintiffs, one allowing them to act as
true “citizen attorneys general”; 2) modifies statutory language to
ensure that only plaintiffs, and not defendants, may recover
attorneys’ fees following a suit; 3) clarifies the federal nature of state
regulations pursuant to federal laws, thus ensuring that the Eleventh
Amendment does not immunize state officials from citizen suits; and

12. George Van Cleve, Congressional Power to Confer Broad Citizen Standing in
Environmental Cases, 29 ENVTL. L. REP. 10028, 10028 (1999).
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4) reaffirms whom Congress intended to be eligible to recover
litigation costs following a citizen suit.
As this article seeks to explain, today it is critically important for
citizens to be able to fully exercise their role as private enforcers of
environmental law. Congress has the power, and we believe the
responsibility, to eliminate the obstacles and disincentives that
prevent citizen plaintiffs from supplementing government
enforcement. The modest legislative changes we propose could
ensure that citizens have easier access to the courts, as Congress
originally intended, and that environmental statutes do not go
unenforced.
I. ENFORCING ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
As one senator has stated, without effective enforcement,
13
environmental protection “lacks meaning, lacks truth, lacks reality.”
Indeed, environmental statutes are only effective to the extent that
they are enforced. Any standard set by statute or regulation, if not
enforced, acts merely as a recommendation. To facilitate the massive
task of ensuring compliance with environmental laws, Congress
created a parallel enforcement regime consisting of both agency and
14
Congress hoped that citizen suits would
citizen enforcement.
supplement government action at times when a lack of resources or
political considerations would prevent agencies from detecting
15
violations or enforcing the law. In fact, citizen suit provisions have
16
been called “sustenance to a starving agency” and the “essential
17
backbone” of environmental regulation.
Congress intended that environmental laws would be enforced
through a dual regime consisting of both government and citizen
18
enforcement. This part will explain these two components and the
13. Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, Oversight of the Environmental
Protection Agency's Enforcement Program: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Toxic Substances,
st
Environmental Oversight, Research and Development, 101st Cong. 1 Sess. S. Hrg. 101–503, Nov.
15, 1989, at 2 (statement of Sen. Joseph I. Lieberman).
14. See infra Part I.A.
15. For a discussion of congressional intent regarding citizen suits, see infra Part I.C.
16. Mark Seidenfeld & Janna Satz Nugent, The Friendship of the People: Citizen
Participation in Environmental Enforcement, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 269, 283 (2005).
17. Van Cleve, supra note 12, at 10028.
18. For simplicity, this article classifies the methods of enforcement of environmental laws
into broad categories: government enforcement and citizen enforcement. The category of
government enforcement includes agency actions such as notices of violations, penalties and
fines, and actual criminal prosecution by state agencies and U.S. attorneys. Citizen enforcement
simply means powers exercised under citizen suit provisions.
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theories supporting each, first by discussing the cooperative federalist
approach to regulation and enforcement, and later by examining the
structure and purpose of citizen suit provisions.
A. Government Enforcement: “Cooperative Federalism”
The major environmental statutes are, of course, federal laws,
but the states are primarily responsible for implementing and
enforcing them. The goal of the CAA is “to protect and enhance the
quality of the Nation’s air resources so as to promote the public
19
health and welfare.”
The statute gives states the primary
responsibility to carry out the act through state implementation plans,
while the federal government’s role is to preserve the states’ ability to
20
do so. Federal statutes such as the CAA set minimum requirements,
and state agencies are allowed to develop implementation plans—
consistent with federal objectives and subject to federal approval—to
21
carry out the goals of the statute. A federal agency, such as the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), will be in charge of
approving state programs and must monitor the programs for
22
continued compliance.
23
This arrangement is called “cooperative federalism.” Prior to
1970, environmental concerns could only be addressed through
private tort actions or individual state laws, which were often weak or
24
non-existent. In the 1970s, Congress decided to try the cooperative
approach to environmental enforcement, not only to add
enforcement options, but also to remedy the “race to the bottom” in
25
state environmental regulation. The cooperative approach is also
19. CAA § 101(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1) (2006).
20. Id. at § 101(a). In the CWA, moreover, Congress expresses its intent to “recognize,
preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of States to prevent, reduce, and
eliminate pollution.” CWA § 101(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (2006).
21. See, e.g., CAA § 110(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(1) (2006) (the Administrator to approve
state plans that “provid[e] for implementation, maintenance, and enforcement of such primary
standard in each air quality control region.”).
22. Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a) (2006).
23. Robert Fischman, Cooperative Federalism and Natural Resources Law, 14 N.Y.U
ENVTL. L. J., 179, 183 (2006).
24. See Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570, 600
(1996) (“Until quite recently, the harms that accrued from air and water pollution were
addressed . . . through the most decentralized of control mechanisms: nuisance law.”).
25. A “race to the bottom” refers to competition between states for business, which can
lead to weakening environmental regulations. “[M]embers of Congress repeatedly stated their
belief that the states had failed to adopt effective air pollution programs because they were
engaged in a ‘race-to-the-bottom.’ States that were eager to attract and keep economic
development purportedly competed against each other by relaxing environmental regulations
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intended to streamline the administrative process, spread the burden
of enforcement, and allow states more autonomy to customize their
implementation plans—all without compromising the goals of the
26
statute. States with approved programs are generally authorized to
issue permits, assess penalties, bring civil actions against violators,
27
and negotiate settlements between parties.
However, cooperative federalism also means that, after it
approves a state program, the federal agency with jurisdiction has
much less of a role in overseeing compliance. Although the federal
government retains the authority to prosecute violations—or
28
“federalize” a program—state agencies are largely responsible for
29
enforcement, usually with little oversight from federal agencies.
As Part II will discuss, the cooperative federalist approach can be
30
described as a “double edged sword.” While a decentralized model
that relies on state enforcement may seem efficient, there are
significant disadvantages.
For example, when states become
primarily responsible for carrying out the laws, budget cuts, political
considerations, and interstate competition affect the zealousness of
regulation and can lead to disparate enforcement of laws. And the
federal government has proven unable to fully make up the difference
when state enforcement fails.

below some optimal level.” Robert L. Glicksman, From Cooperative to Inoperative Federalism:
The Perverse Mutation of Environmental Law and Policy, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 719, 737
(2006).
26. By allowing states to implement and enforce federal programs, the cooperative
approach allows states to draw upon the expertise of state agencies and knowledge of local
conditions. However, delegated state programs are always subject to federal oversight to ensure
that they comply with federal standards. See e.g., CAA § 124(a), § 7424 “Assurance of
adequacy of State plans.”
27. For example, State Implementation Plans (“SIPs”) under the Clean Air Act. CAA §
110.
28. We use the term “federalization” to refer to the federal government’s authority to
withdraw approval of a state program and institute a federal program in its place.
29. Three-fourths of environmental regulatory programs have been delegated to state
agencies, and states undertake a vast majority of the enforcement. David L. Markell, The Role
of Deterrence-Based Enforcement in a “Reinvented” State/Federal Relationship: The Divide
Between Theory and Reality, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 32 (2000) (“State predominance is the
norm in the enforcement realm . . . . States conduct roughly ninety percent of the inspections in
this country, and, according to leading state officials, they bring approximately eighty to ninety
percent of all enforcement actions.”).
30. David R. Hodas, Enforcement of Environmental Law in a Triangular Federal System:
Can Three Not Be a Crowd When Enforcement Authorization Is Shared by the United States, the
States, and Their Citizens?, 54 MD. L. REV. 1552, 1574 (1995).
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1. Cooperative Federalism in Action: Ohio’s SMCRA
Regulations
The state of Ohio’s laws and regulations implementing the
31
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA) provide a
timely example of the purposes, advantages, and disadvantages of a
32
cooperative approach to environmental regulation and enforcement.
With the passage of SMCRA in 1977, Congress set federal
standards for the regulation of surface coal mining operations as well
as standards for the reclamation—the cleanup and rehabilitation—of
33
abandoned mine lands. SMCRA prompted the creation of a new
federal agency, the Office of Surface Mining and Reclamation
34
Enforcement (OSM), within the Department of the Interior. OSM
is charged with enforcing SMCRA and overseeing state approved
35
programs.
2. Delegation of Primary Enforcement Obligations
SMCRA allows coal-producing states to draft and submit their
36
own implementation plans for approval by OSM. To gain approval
of its program, a coal-producing state must demonstrate that it “has
37
the capability of carrying out the provisions” of SMCRA. Among
other requirements, a state program must provide sanctions for
violations of surface mining laws; demonstrate sufficient
administrative and technical personnel and funding to regulate coal
mining; institute a permit system in conformity with federal law; and
establish procedures for the designation of certain areas as
38
“unsuitable for surface coal mining.”
Ohio’s regulatory program was approved by OSM in 1982 and is
codified in section 1513 of the Ohio Revised Code. Ohio’s
implementation plan thus gained “primacy,” and Ohio’s Department
of Natural Resources was given jurisdiction over the state’s surface
mining program. Today, Ohio is one of the many coal-producing

31. Ohio’s implementation SMCRA is found in Ohio Revised Code Chapter 1513.
32. In Part II, we will again use Ohio’s SMCRA implementing program to provide
evidence of the disadvantages of the cooperative approach to regulation and enforcement.
33. SMCRA(SMCRA) of 1977 § 102, 30 U.S.C. § 1202 (2006).
34. Id. at § 201(a), § 1211(a).
35. Id. at § 201(c), § 1211(c).
36. Id. at § 503(a), § 1253(a).
37. Id.
38. Id.
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states with approved programs implementing the requirements of
39
SMCRA.
3. The State-Federal Interface
A key feature of cooperative federalism, however, is the
continuing oversight exercised by the federal agency with jurisdiction.
OSM reviews various aspects of Ohio’s program and its regulation of
40
mining operations, including the adequacy of the state’s staff. If any
part of a state program fails to meet federal standards, OSM has the
authority to propose rulemaking or legislative changes to address the
41
problem.
OSM also retains the authority to “federalize”—or
retake—Ohio’s program at any time if it fails to carry out its statutory
42
obligations. As we describe in Part II, however, federalization of a
43
state program is an option that is rarely used.
B. Citizen Suit Provisions: Structure & Purpose
To complement the federalist approach to government
enforcement, Congress included citizen suit provisions in almost
44
every major environmental law.
These provisions allow private
plaintiffs to seek injunctions or recover damages from violators of
45
environmental laws. Citizen suits were included—after significant
deliberation and debate among legislators—because Congress knew
that despite the cooperative federalist regulatory scheme, government
would never be fully able to enforce the law. Congress knew that
effective enforcement of environmental law would require

39. Of the 26 coal-producing states, only Tennessee and Washington have federally
administered SMCRA programs. These states are called “Federal Program States.” Office of
Surface Mining and Reclamation Enforcement, Annual Evaluation Reports of States and
Tribes, http://www.osmre.gov/Reports/EvalInfo/EvalInfo.shtm (last visited Dec. 30, 2009).
40. See Office of Surface Mining and Reclamation Enforcement, OSM Annual Evaluation
and Summary Report (2008), http://www.osmre.gov/Reports/EvalInfo/2008/OH08-aml-reg.pdf
(last visited Dec. 30, 2009).
41. See SMCRA § 504(b), 30 U.S.C. § 1254(b) (2006).
42. “In the event that a State has a State program for surface coal mining, and is not
enforcing any part of such program, the Secretary may provide for the Federal enforcement . . .
of that part of the State program not being enforced by such State. Id.
43. See infra Part II.C.1.
44. See supra note 7, for a list of laws with citizen suit provisions.
45. Importantly, plaintiffs may not personally recover money damages. “Any benefit from
the lawsuit, whether injunctive or monetary, inures to the public or to the United States.”
Chesapeake Bay Found. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 608 F. Supp. 440, 449 (D. Md.1985).
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government to have, as two scholars have described it, the “friendship
46
of the people.”
1. Text & Structure
As the Supreme Court has written, “There is, of course, no more
persuasive evidence of the purpose of a statute than the words by
47
which the legislature undertook to give expression to its wishes.” It
is clear from reading the statutes as well as their legislative histories
that Congress intended citizens to be active enforcers of the law, with
broad powers to sue. Congress’ decision to include liberal attorneys’
48
fees provisions, for example, and to eliminate procedural barriers
49
such as federal amount in controversy requirements, provides
evidence that legislators intended significant public participation.
a. Clean Air Act (CAA) Section 304
The CAA of 1970 was the first federal law to include a citizen
suit provision, and it is a good representation of the general
structure50 of analogous provisions in other environmental
Section 304 of the CAA contains its citizen suit
statutes.
provision:
(a) [A]ny person may commence a civil suit action on his own
behalf –
(1) against any person [including a state or government agency]
who is alleged to have violated. . .or be in violation of (A) an
emission standard or limitation under this chapter or (B) an order
issued by the Administrator or a State with respect to such a
standard or limitation [or]
(2) against the Administrator where there is alleged a failure of the
Administrator to perform any act or duty under this chapter with is
not discretionary with the Administrator.
(b) No action may be commenced (1) under subsection (a)(1) of
this section (A) prior to 60 days after the plaintiff has given notice
of the violation (i) to the [EPA] Administrator, (ii) to the State in
which the violation occurs, and (iii) to any alleged violator…[No
action may be commenced] (B) if the Administrator or State has

46. Seidenfeld and Nugent quote Niccolo Machiavelli, who once wrote that even powerful
governments require “the friendship of the people,” in arguing that government needs citizens
to enforce environmental laws. Seidenfeld and Nugent, supra note 16, at 269.
47. United States v. American Trucking Ass’ns, 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940).
48. See infra Part I.B.d.
49. See infra Part I.B.c.
50. The citizen suit provisions in all major environmental statutes are almost identical. See
supra note 7.
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commenced and is diligently prosecuting a civil action in a court of
51
the United States or a State to require compliance.

b. Notice Requirements: Preserving the Primacy of Government
Enforcement
Citizen suit provisions such as CAA section 304 require potential
plaintiffs to provide the violator with 60 days notice before
52
commencing a suit. CAA section 304(b) also requires plaintiffs to
provide notice to the federal agency with jurisdiction—in this case,
53
EPA—and, in some cases, to a state agency with jurisdiction. The
notice must generally be in writing and provide a description of the
54
alleged violation of law.
Notice provisions serve several functions. First, in theory, the
notice provision will give the violator an opportunity to abate the
violation and avoid the need for litigation. More importantly,
however, the notice requirement ensures that federal and state
government agencies are aware of each alleged violation and are
55
given an opportunity to take enforcement action. This procedure
preserves the government’s role as the primary enforcer of
environmental laws. A citizen suit may proceed only when state and
federal agencies are informed of an alleged violation, and choose not
56
to begin an enforcement proceeding.
Finally, the notice provisions also allow government to utilize
public vigilance. Citizen suit statutes enable agencies to, in effect,
“farm out” much of the fact-finding and initial legal work to citizen
activists. One of the drafters of the CAA’s citizen suit provision said
he envisioned that citizens would be useful “for detecting violations

51. CAA § 304(a)–(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)–(b) (2006).
52. Id. at § 304(b), § 7604(b).
53. Id. at § 304(b)(1)(A), §7604(b)(1)(A).
54. Id.
55. “The notice requirement was intended to ‘further encourage and provide for agency
enforcement’ that might obviate the need to resort to the courts.” Natural Res. Def. Council v.
Train, 510 F.2d 692, 700 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (quoting Senator Edmund Muskie).
56. Note that a citizen suit is barred, moreover, if the government “has commenced and is
diligently prosecuting a civil action in a court of the United States or a State to require
compliance.” This language prevents government and citizens from simultaneously suing the
same violator for the same violation of law. See, e.g., CAA § 304(b)(1)(B), 42 U.S.C. §
7604(b)(1)(B) (2006). The definitions of “diligently prosecuting” and “court,” as you might
imagine, have been much litigated. See Hodas, supra note 30, at 1631 (discussing the so-called
“diligent prosecution bar” to the initiation of citizen suits.).
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and bringing them to the attention of the enforcement agencies,” who
57
presumably would then take over enforcement proceedings.
c. Facilitating Citizen Litigation
While we must recognize that notice provisions indicate that
Congress wanted agencies to remain the primary enforcers of the law,
citizen suit provisions contain unique features intended to facilitate
citizen litigation. Most obviously, the statutes purport to grant
universal standing to sue, providing that “any person may commence
58
a civil suit” without any further mention of injury requirements.
There can be no more persuasive evidence of Congress’ intent to
facilitate access to the courts than its attempted grant of universal
standing.
Further, citizens are expressly authorized to sue either the
federal government agency with jurisdiction—EPA in the case of the
59
CAA—or the appropriate state agency. The provisions also grant
the district court’s jurisdiction “to compel. . .agency action [that is]
60
Congress even scuttles amount in
unreasonably delayed.”
controversy and diversity requirements, which are traditional
prerequisites to federal court actions, in order to increase citizen
61
participation.
Finally, the non-restriction language of CAA section 304(e) acts
62
as a final incentive for citizen litigation. The statute provides that
bringing a citizen suit “[shall not] restrict any right which any person
(or class of persons) may have under any statute or common law to
seek enforcement of any standard or limitation or to seek any other
63
relief.” The non-restriction language makes clear that citizen suit
plaintiffs will not forfeit their rights to sue for damages in separate

57. Senate Debate on S. 4358, Sept. 21, 1970, reprinted in Environmental Policy Division of
the Congressional Reference Service, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WATER POLLUTION
CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1972, Vol. II at 280.
58. See, e.g., CAA § 304(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (2006). The Supreme Court has
challenged this grant of universal standing in a long line of cases, which will be discussed in Part
III.B., infra.
59. Most citizen suit provisions allow an individual to commence a suit against the U.S. or
against a state agency “to the extent permitted by the Eleventh Amendment.” See id.
60. Id.
61. See Train, 510 F.2d at 700 (“[C]itizen suits are intended to] facilitate the citizen's role in
the enforcement of the Act, both in renouncing those concepts that make federal jurisdiction
dependent on diversity of citizenship and jurisdictional amount, and in removing the barrier, or
hindrance, to citizen suits that might be threatened by challenges to plaintiff's standing.”).
62. See CAA § 304(e), 42 U.S.C. § 7604(e) (2006).
63. Id.
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actions, thus removing a potential disincentive to bring suit. This is
an important issue because a plaintiff cannot recover damages in a
64
citizen suit enforcement action.
Therefore, a plaintiff who has
suffered actual money losses may sue to enforce the statute and also
may bring a separate common law tort claim for money damages.
d. Costs & Attorney’s Fees
The inclusion of novel fee shifting provisions, however, provides
perhaps the strongest evidence that Congress wanted to facilitate
vigorous citizen participation. Each citizen suit provision contains a
cost clause allowing “prevailing” or “substantially prevailing
65
plaintiffs” to recoup litigation expenses.
Several environmental
statutes, moreover, provide that a court may award costs and
attorneys’ fees to any party “whenever the court determines such
award is appropriate,” suggesting that even unsuccessful plaintiffs
66
could recover litigation expenses. Costs are normally awarded only
to prevailing plaintiffs pursuant to fee-shifting provisions, and not to
67
prevailing defendants.
In effect, these costs provisions in environmental statutes enable
successful plaintiffs—and arguably even unsuccessful plaintiffs—to
recover attorneys’ fees from losing defendants.
Thus, these
provisions allow plaintiffs with meritorious claims, and the lawyers
representing them, to bring suit with confidence that they will
ultimately recover their litigation expenses. The opportunity for cost
recovery simultaneously acts as a form of insurance and as an
incentive for citizens to bring suit.
i. Breaking from the “American Rule”
Congress’ inclusion of fee shifting provisions for successful
plaintiffs was a somewhat revolutionary decision, one that is contrary
the general rule in American law. Under the so-called “American
rule” of the common law, both parties in any lawsuit bear their own

64. See Chesapeake Bay, 608 F. Supp. at 449.
65. See, e.g., CWA § 304(d), 42 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (2006).
66. CAA § 304(d), 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (2006). Compare CWA § 304(d), 42 U.S.C. § 1365(d)
(2006), and CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9659(f) (2006) (limiting the award of litigation costs to
“prevailing or substantially prevailing parties.”).
67. To date, only a handful of courts have awarded attorneys’ fees to a prevailing
defendant pursuant to a fee shifting provision. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Shell Oil, 817 F.2d 1169,
1176 (5th Cir. 1987); see also Kerry D. Florio, Attorneys’ Fees in Environmental Citizen Suits:
Should Prevailing Defendants Recover?, 27 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 707, 707–08 (2000).
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litigation expenses, regardless of the outcome.
American courts
have consistently upheld this view for two reasons: 1) because lesswealthy plaintiffs should not be discouraged from bringing
meritorious lawsuits out of fear that they will lose and have to pay
expenses to the winner; and 2) because the calculation of “reasonable
69
fees” is too difficult for courts. The only exceptions to this rule are
70
for “frivolous” claims and citizen suit plaintiffs.
ii. The “Appropriate” Standard
Further, Congress’ use of an “appropriate” standard for fee
recovery indicates that the legislative intent was to allow even
unsuccessful plaintiffs to recover fees if deemed appropriate by a
court. The statute does not limit fees to winning plaintiffs, but leaves
open the possibility that unsuccessful or partially successful plaintiffs
could recover when their legal action nonetheless advances the public
71
interest. In Ruckleshaus v. Sierra Club, however, the Supreme Court
rejected this possibility by holding that unsuccessful plaintiffs may not
72
recover attorneys’ fees, despite the statute’s language.
Justice
Stevens argued, in dissent, that the use of the “appropriate” standard
was a deliberate act by Congress to give courts the discretion to
award costs to unsuccessful plaintiffs whose suits advance the public
73
interest.
74
The notice provisions show that Congress wanted government
to be the primary enforcer. Nonetheless, the statutory exception to

68. See Fleishman Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 717 (1967)
(explaining the “English rule,” which by contrast, provides that the loser pays the litigation
expenses of the winner, including expert fees, attorney’s fees, and court costs).
69. See id. at 718 (“[O]ne should not be penalized for merely defending or prosecuting a
lawsuit, and that the poor might be unjustly discouraged from instituting actions to vindicate
their rights if the penalty for losing included the fees of their opponents' counsel.”).
70. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 258–59 (1975)
(explaining that Courts may still award attorneys’ fees to a party when a complaint is frivolous,
because the “bad faith exception” allows a successful party to recover attorneys’ fees from an
opponent who acted “in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons”).
71. See, e.g., CAA § 304(d).
72. 463 U.S. 680, 693 (1983).
73. See id. at 694 (Stevens noting that in other federal statutes with attorneys’ fees
provisions, Congress specifically limited recovery to “prevailing” or “partially prevailing”
plaintiffs, suggesting that Congress did not intend to limit the class of plaintiffs who could
recover under citizen suits by stating that “Congress deliberately used language that differs from
the ‘prevailing party’ standard, and it carefully explained in the legislative history that it
intended to give the courts of appeals discretionary authority to award fees and costs to a
broader category of parties.”).
74. See, e.g., CAA § 304(b)(1)(A).
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the American rule created by Congress provides evidence that
citizens, too, were intended to play an active role in enforcement of
environmental law.
2. Legislative History
Parsing the legislative history behind citizen suit provisions
reinforces Congress’ apparent goal—evident on the face of the
statutes themselves—to confer broad enforcement powers to citizens.
75
We examine the legislative history behind sections 304 of the CAA
76
and 505 of the CWA as well as the courts’ initial response to citizen
suit provisions as evidence of Congress’ intent.
a. Environmental Protection: A “Fundamental Concern” to
Citizens
The legislative history behind citizen suit provisions indicates
that citizens were expected to take action when, for financial or
77
political reasons, agencies failed to act.
Citizens were at once
intended to serve as watchdogs, inspectors, and prosecutors—and
citizen suit provisions were intended to encourage this public
vigilance. Senator Edmund Muskie (D-ME) argued on the Senate
floor that “citizens can be a useful instrument for detecting violations
and bringing them to the attention of the enforcement agencies and
78
courts alike.” Legislators such as Muskie hoped that citizens would
be able to do much of the necessary information gathering and
79
litigation, reducing the financial burden on government agencies.
Thus, citizen litigation allows the government to utilize much of the
technical work performed by non-governmental organizations or
private citizens.
The nature of the public rights involved was also considered as a
justification for the unprecedented power given to citizens. There is
evidence that Congress intended the public to have a role in
environmental protection in part because clean air and clean water
are of fundamental importance to the lives of all citizens. During
debate over the passage of the CAA, Sen. John Sherman Cooper (RKY) argued that “Perhaps more than in any other Federal program,
the regulation of environmental quality is of fundamental concern to
75. See CAA § 304(e).
76. See CWA § 505(a).
77. See Jeannette L. Austin, The Rise of Citizen-Suit Enforcement in Environmental Law:
Reconciling Private and Public Attorneys General, 81 NW. U. L. REV. 220, 246 (1987).
78. Statement of Senator Muskie, supra note 57, at 280.
79. See Austin, supra note 77, at 245–46, n. 164.
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the public. It is appropriate, therefore, that an opportunity be
80
provided for citizen involvement.”
b. Judicial Interpretation
The courts have largely acceded to our interpretation, accepting
Congress’ intent to promote public action. In Natural Resources
Defense Council v. Train, for example, the D.C. Circuit stated that
“[a]nyone even remotely familiar with the case law of the period will
discern that this provision took broad steps to facilitate the citizen’s
81
role in the enforcement of the Act.”
The Supreme Court has also largely accepted that Congress
intended to grant citizens broad enforcement power, although the
Court’s discussion of citizen suits is often muddled in a debate over
82
standing and Congress’ power to grant citizen standing. It would be
fair to say, though, that the Court has always recognized the intent of
Congress to empower citizen attorneys general; but the justices have
83
not always recognized its ability to do so.
II. THE FAILURE OF COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM & DECLINING
AGENCY ENFORCEMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
In Part II, we expand on our discussion of cooperative
federalism. This part outlines the major reasons why a cooperative
approach is unable to enforce all environmental laws and includes a
discussion of several emerging challenges which will inhibit agency
enforcement of these laws in the future. Most importantly, this part
argues that the current political and economic climate undermines the
theories supporting the cooperative federalist enforcement model.
We argue that the fundamental enforcement challenges inherent in a
decentralized model will be exacerbated by what appears to be a
84
multi-year economic recession.

80. 117 CONG. REC. 38,821 (1971) (statement of Sen. John Sherman Cooper).
81. See Train, 510 F.2d at 700 (referring to the CWA’s citizen suit provision); see also
Alyeska Pipeline, 421 U.S. at 263 (noting that with citizen suits, “[c]ongress has opted to rely
heavily on private enforcement to implement public policy”).
82. See discussion infra Part III.
83. See generally Lujan v. Def. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (Justice Scalia recognizing
Congress’s intent to convey broad citizen standing under the Endangered Species Act’s citizen
suit provision).
84. See Barack Obama, Editorial, The Action Americans Need, WASH. POST, Feb. 5, 2009,
at A17 (calling the current U.S. economic crisis one that is “as deep and dire as any since the
days of the Great Depression” and stating that the recovery of the economy, “will be measured
in years, not months”).
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The enforcement of environmental law can be described using
the metaphor of a three-legged stool consisting of state, federal, and
85
citizen legs. Following this metaphor, we see that the first two legs
of the stool are increasingly unreliable and unsteady—making a
strong “citizen leg” all the more necessary to support the weight of
resource protection.
A. The Decentralized Enforcement Model
The primary goal of federal environmental statutes was to
empower states to enforce national standards. With the passage of
the CWA, for example, Congress’ intent was to “recognize, preserve,
and protect the primary responsibilities of States to prevent, reduce,
86
and eliminate pollution.” Each of the other environmental statutes
87
The theory was that, by
envisions a similar state function.
outsourcing federal programs to state agencies, national laws could be
carried out without bankrupting the federal government, while at the
same time allowing states the autonomy to implement their own
88
plans. Consequently, the decentralized enforcement model places a
great deal of power and trust in state governments.
Unfortunately, there are fundamental flaws with the cooperative
approach that hamper regulation and enforcement. At the same time
that states have taken on more responsibility, their own regulatory
agencies have been simultaneously hindered by political resistance to
increased regulation and fewer dollars for enforcement.
Furthermore, in cases where state regulation has failed, the federal
backup enforcement has been lacking. When combined, these
complicating factors create the potential for a “perfect storm” that
threatens the effectiveness of every major environmental program.
1. Increasing State Oversight
Today, states oversee almost every delegable environmental
program, and state agencies account for the vast majority of

85. See Hodas, supra note 30, at 1617 (describing this cooperative model as a “triangular
federal system,” consisting of state, federal, and citizen enforcement).
86. CWA § 304(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (2006).
87. See, e.g., CAA § 110(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a) (2006) (describing requirements for “state
implementation plans for national . . . ambient air quality standards”).
88. See Howard A. Learner, Restraining Federal Preemption When There is an “Emerging
Consensus” of State Environmental Laws and Policies, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 649, 655 (2008).
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inspections and enforcement actions. Over the last two decades,
states have taken on an increasingly large role in enforcement. In
1994, only forty percent of delegable environmental programs had
90
been delegated to state agencies. In 2000, states were in charge of
91
implementing seventy percent of delegable programs. By 2007, the
92
percentage had risen to over ninety.
As states have gradually taken on more responsibility for
environmental programs, there has been a corresponding decrease in
federal funding for state agency programs. In 1986, federal EPA
funds accounted for fifty-eight percent of state budgets for the
93
enforcement of federal laws. By 2008, federal appropriations had
been reduced to twenty-three percent of state environmental
94
budgets.
On one hand, the decrease in federal funding makes sense in a
decentralized system. One purpose of a federalist approach is, in fact,
to reduce the financial burden on the federal government by
delegating programs. At the same time, however, the loss of federal
funding removes one of the incentives, or “carrots,” used to
95
encourage state enforcement of national standards. And when the
federal government reduces spending on oversight and enforcement,
states must increase their own spending to make up the balance of
enforcement funding.
B. Disadvantages to State Administration—The “Unlevel Playing
Field”
States now have the authority to implement federal programs as
well as the financial responsibility to fund them. The gradual
delegation of environmental programs over the last two decades has
increased the importance of states and made environmental

89. See R. Steven Brown, Environmental Council of the States (ECOS), State
Environmental Expenditures 2005 – 2008, 1 (2008), http://www.ecos.org/files/3057_file_March_
2008_Green_Report.pdf.
90. Id. at 3 (quantifying delegable environmental programs such as the CWA, CAA, and
SMCRA programs, as well as programs implementing numerous other environmental laws).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 5.
95. See CWA § 106(e), 33 U.S.C. 1256(e) (2006) (explaining how EPA can condition grants
to help implement federal programs on states’ compliance with CWA’s water quality
monitoring procedures.); see also Robert L. Fischman, Cooperative Federalism and Natural
Resources Law, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 179, 191 (2005).
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enforcement vulnerable to the several inherent flaws of a
decentralized model. At least one scholar has described the
fundamental disadvantage of cooperative federalism as the problem
96
of “the unlevel playing field.” That is, the cooperative model makes
the enforcement of federal laws dependant on individual states, each
with its own unique financial and political circumstances.
1. Political Considerations & “Competitive Business Advantage”
The major challenge for states is that they must balance the
environmental benefits of vigorous enforcement of environmental
programs with the economic consequences of stringent regulation.
Not surprisingly, each state wants to foster a competitive business
advantage to attract and keep jobs within its borders. No governor or
state administrator wants to implement policies that could dissuade
industry from expanding or relocating in his or her state, and no state
wants to risk losing jobs because a company perceives that a
97
neighboring state’s regulations are more business-friendly.
For
these reasons, many states feel pressure to deregulate and reduce
enforcement actions in an effort to attract and keep jobs in-state.
These pressures create what has been called a “perverse incentive”
98
for state administrators to weaken regulations and ignore violations.
a. Ohio’s Regulatory Reform Task Force
The competitive advantage challenge has manifested itself in an
increased “regulatory reform” effort in Ohio, an effort which is
designed to promote business growth in the state. In 2008, a
bipartisan group of state lawmakers created a Regulatory Reform
Task Force with the express purpose of reducing the “red tape and
bureaucracy. . .to ensure [that Ohio is] competitive with other states
and countries that are competing for the same jobs and economic
99
investment.”
The task force traveled the state listening to testimony from
business owners, many of whom complained about excessive

96. See Hodas, supra note 30, at 1574.
97. See id. at 1575 (“States with strong environmental programs feel intense local political
pressure to slacken enforcement, while states with weak programs are loath to abandon the
economic advantage that lax environmental enforcement provides.”).
98. Glicksman, supra note 25.
99. Ohio General Assembly Task Force, Ohio Regulatory Reform Task Force Rep. 1
(2008).
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100

regulation from Ohio EPA. A major theme of the public fora was
101
the threat that environmental regulations pose to job creation. The
final recommendations of Ohio’s task force, and subsequent
legislation introduced by its chairman, aim to “streamline” agency
administration of the laws, including many of the procedures designed
102
to ensure effective environmental regulation.
The proposed
legislation requires, among other things, that agencies provide an
analysis of how the adverse impacts of a regulation on small
businesses can be lessened through methods such as alternative
compliance methods, small-business-specific performance standards,
and even exemptions from environmental regulation for small
103
businesses.
This type of legislation sets the stage for a renewed
104
“race to the bottom.”
b. The Governor’s “Common Sense Business Regulations”
In February of 2008, Governor Ted Strickland of Ohio signed
Executive Order 2008-04S, entitled “Implementing Common Sense
105
Business Regulations.” In many ways, the Order mirrors the goals
of Ohio Regulatory Reform Task Force. For example, the Order
mandates that “[a]gencies should consider whether proposed rules,
and the cumulative effect of proposed rules, make Ohio a more or
106
less attractive place to do business.”
Regulatory reform efforts such as those in Ohio illustrate the
political challenges that can stand in the way of increased, or even
status quo, state regulation. In a state such as Ohio, which is losing

100. Id. (illustrating how one business owner testified that his wind turbine company
ultimately decided not to locate its business in Ohio because the state’s environmental
permitting process was “so cumbersome, costly and time-consuming” and “[could] not match
the 30-45 day permitting process of Alabama and South Dakota”).
101. See id. at 1–2 (testimony of Dan Lake and Mark Wilson regarding Ohio EPA’s
permitting requirements.).
102. See id. at 5 (committee making recommendations that all new regulations be subject to
an “economic impact and/or cost benefit analysis that consider all of the relevant factors to
business and interested parties in implementing and complying with the rules”). Legislation
recently introduced in the Ohio legislature contains similar cost-benefit requirements for all
agency rule-making. Id.
103. 128th Ohio General Assembly, Am. S. B. No. 3, 128th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio
2009).
104. See Glicksman, supra note 25 (quoting John P. Dwyer, The Practice of Federalism
Under the Clean Air Act, 54 Md. L. Rev. 1183, 1221–22 (1995)).
105. Executive
Order
2008-04S
(2008),
http://www.governor.ohio.gov/Portals/0/
Executive%20Orders/Executive%20Order%202008-04S.pdf.
106. See id. at 3 (Gov. Strickland, a Democrat, illustrating that regulatory reform efforts are
not limited to “small-government” conservatives).
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107

jobs at an especially high rate, policies aimed at business growth
108
may trump environmental protection. State executives and agencies
will continue to hesitate to increase oversight and enforcement
proceedings out of fear that these actions could sacrifice the state’s
competitive business advantage. There is a default political resistance
to increased environmental protection in states such as Ohio.
Lawmakers and officials from both political parties face the same
pressures to deregulate and reform.
Importantly, while state officials are proposing ways to reduce
the regulatory burden on business, there is no corresponding effort to
increase environmental oversight. In this way, the political deck is
stacked against increased environmental enforcement. An economic
recession, such as today’s, will only add to the institutional opposition
to regulation, making environmental enforcement by state agencies
all the more difficult.
2. State Budget Cuts
The cooperative model also makes the enforcement of national
environmental objectives subject to budget cuts and shortfalls in each
individual state, which further threatens the effectiveness of
cooperative federalism. Unlike the federal government, most states
are bound by balanced budget laws and are unable to run deficits
109
during economic recessions.
Therefore, states must balance their
budgets each year and are more susceptible to economic cycles.
In fiscal year 2009, twenty-nine states are expected to face budget
110
gaps of a combined $48 billion.
In an economic recession, states
111
lose revenue from sales taxes and property taxes, which forces state
governors to make difficult choices: either cut spending, raise taxes,

107. See generally Charles W. McMillion, OHIO’S JOB LOSSES: 2000 TO 2007 WORST LOSSES
SINCE THE DEPRESSION, MBG Information Services 3 (2008), available at http://
www.amtacdc.org/SiteCollectionDocuments/Ohio-jobs-AMTAC%20(2).pdf
(showing that
Ohio’s job losses since 2000 – approximately 213,000 – are exceeded only by Michigan’s).
108. See Ohio General Assembly Task Force, supra note 99.
109. See William Branigin and Lori Montgomery, Obama’s Budget Proposal Would Push
Budget Deficit to $1.75T, WASH POST, Feb. 26., 2009 (explaining how the 2009 federal budget,
recently proposed by the Obama administration, allows an estimated $1.75 trillion deficit).
Compare OHIO. CONST. art. VIII § 8, XII, § 4 (Ohio’s constitutional requirement of a balanced
budget), and NY CLS LEGIS LAW. § 54(2)(a) (New York’s constitutional requirement of a
balanced budget).
110. Erica C. McNichol & Iris J. Lav, 29 States Faced Total Budget Shortfalls of at Least $48
Billion in 2009, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities 1 (2008), http://www.cbpp.org/1-1508sfp.pdf.
111. See id. at 2.
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or borrow money to meet annual budgets. Many states are choosing
the first option, cutting services, to make up for lost revenue. As we
explain below, decreases in enforcement funding at the state level
compound each of the inherent shortcomings of the decentralized
model such as the competitive advantage challenge.
a. California’s Agency Funding Cuts
California provides the most prominent example of how a state
budget shortfall can translate into less stringent enforcement of
national environmental standards. No state’s budget has been harder
112
hit by the recent economic downturn than California’s. The state’s
budget shortfall, estimated at over $40 billion through 2010, is already
113
affecting government services. At no point in recent history has the
state reacted to fiscal issues with such deep cuts in services. In the
Spring of 2009, the state began a round of multibillion-dollar budget
cuts, including $30 billion in cuts over two fiscal years to schools,
colleges, health care, welfare, corrections, recreation, and other
114
programs.
To meet its 2009 budget, California has proposed cutting the
enforcement budgets of numerous agencies charged with carrying out
115
federal environmental laws. For example, California’s Departments
of Forestry, Fish and Game, Toxic Substances, and California’s air
116
and water boards each stand to lose millions.
The California
Environmental Protection Agency as a whole will lose $480 million
117
from 2008, a cut of twenty percent of its annual budget.
These
agencies are charged with implementing almost every delegable
118
The state will also layoff 20,000
federal environmental program.
119
state employees, with the layoffs spread across all state agencies.

112. See id. at 3.
113. Jean Ross, Strangling California’s Budget, L.A. TIMES, January 27, 2009, available at
http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/la-oe-ross27-2009jan27,0,2053416.story.
http://
114. California Budget Crisis (2008-09), N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2009,
topics.nytimes.com/topics/news/national/usstatesterritoriesandpossessions/california/budget_cris
is_2008_09/index.html.
115. Jordan Rau, Pain of Budget Plan is Widely Spread, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2008, at B7.
116. Id.
117. FISCAL YEAR 2008-09 BUDGET BRIEFING, CALIFORNIA ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www.calepa.ca.gov/Budget/2008_2009/Briefing.pdf (last visited
Dec. 27, 2009).
118. See generally id. (illustrating how these agencies enforce California’s implementation of
the CAA, CWA, and Toxic Substances Control Act).
119. Nichola Groom, With No Budget, California to Cut 20,000 State Jobs, Feb. 17, 2009,
http://www.reuters.com/article/politicsNews/idUSTRE51G0J420090217.
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Fewer agency dollars and employees will undoubtedly result in
fewer inspections and penalties, less rigorous review of permit
applications, and fewer enforcement proceedings. Budget cuts to
state agencies that enforce California’s delegated programs will have
a direct impact on the enforcement of those federal laws. “You can
pass all the environmental protection laws you want,” says one
California agency official, “but someone has to be there to enforce
120
them.”
California’s struggles also provide an extreme example of how
cooperative federalism can allow one problematic state to impede
national standards. Because of its size, the state has a massive impact
on the achievement of the objectives of national laws. If California,
121
the nation’s most populous state and one of its largest polluters, is
unable to meet CAA standards, it would have a great effect on the
nation’s ability to meet national standards. Under the decentralized
model, therefore, the nation’s environmental quality is dependant on
the unlikely result that each state is able to fully enforce its delegated
programs.
C. Inadequate Federal Backup
Cooperative federalism, in theory, is supposed to provide the
federal backup, remedying the “unlevel playing field” and disparate
state regulation, to ensure that enforcement is not compromised by
political considerations or scarce resources. Federal oversight is
intended to recognize and remove the “competitive advantage
122
enjoyed by under-regulated entities in under-enforcing states.”
However, if the federal government was once able to encourage or
123
coerce compliance as a “gorilla in the closet,” this is no longer true
today. Although the federal government is not bound by the
balanced budget rules of the states, it is still not exercising sufficient
oversight. Federal agencies have not proven that they have the
capacity or inclination to backup state enforcement, and the warnings
of “federalization” of state programs are largely empty threats.
William Cohen, Chief of the General Litigation Section of the Land

120. Rau, supra note 115, at B7 (“Want to pollute? Want to destroy habitats? Want to
poach commercially? Have at it . . . we can’t stop you, says the California official.”).
121. UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU POPULATION ESTIMATES FOR JULY 1, 2008,
http://www.census.gov/popest/states/NST-ann-est.html (last visited Dec. 30, 2009).
122. Hodas, supra note 30, at 1575.
123. DAVID L. MARKELL, REINVENTING ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT & THE
STATE/FEDERAL RELATIONSHIP 3 (2003).

Reisinger_final_cpcxns.doc

24

DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM

2/25/2010 3:06:50 PM

Vol. 20:1

and Natural Resources Division of the Department of Justice “stated
that ‘frankly’ there are just too many enforcement cases ‘out there’
for the federal and state governments to handle and that citizen suits
should be applauded as a ‘natural adjunct’ to government
124
enforcement.”
1. Ohio’s SMCRA Program
Ohio’s surface mining program, again, provides a real-life
example of cooperative federalism’s flaws and highlights the
inadequacy of backup federal enforcement. The SMCRA states that
the OSM must “assure that appropriate procedures are provided
125
for . . . [state] enforcement.” The statute provides that OSM must
withdraw approval of a state program if “the State program is not in
126
compliance” with the requirements of SMCRA.
Further, OSM is
required to “federalize” the state’s surface mining program in the
event that a state does not enforce its own program or if a state
127
program fails to comply with federal standards.
In 1982, the Secretary of the Interior approved Ohio’s regulatory
and abandoned mine lands programs, pursuant to section 405 of
128
SMCRA. Ohio’s program created a Division of Mineral Resources
Management, within the state’s Department of Natural Resources,
which has had the primary enforcement responsibility for carrying out
129
SMCRA since 1982.
Unfortunately, however, Ohio’s surface
mining regulations have never been in full compliance with SMCRA,
and thus state agencies have never been fully enforcing the federal
statute.
Ohio’s implementation of SMCRA’s reclamation bonding
requirements is one example of the state’s non-compliance. SMCRA
requires all coal mining companies, as a prerequisite to mining, to
130
develop plans to “reclaim” mine sites once operations have ceased.
Reclamation—or rehabilitation—operations are necessary to prevent

124. Hodas, supra note 30, at 1560 n.36 (quoting William M. Cohen, Remarks at the ALIABA Environmental Law Course of Study (Feb. 19, 1994)).
125. SMCRA § 102(i), 30 U.S.C. § 1202(i) (2006).
126. Id. at § 405(d), 30 U.S.C. § 1235(d).
127. Id. at § 504(a)(3), 30 U.S.C. § 1253(a)(3).
128. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1513 (West 2009).
129. See generally Ohio Department of Natural Resources, A Citizen’s Guide to Mining and
Reclamation in Ohio 12, available at http://www.ohiodnr.com/Portals/11/publications/
pdf/citizens_guide.pdf (showing that the Division of Mineral Resources Management was
previously referred to as the Division of Mines and Reclamation).
130. SMCRA § 507(d), 30 U.S.C § 1257(d).
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acid mine drainage, erosion, and subsidence and to rehabilitate the
131
Further, as part of
aesthetic characteristics of Ohio’s hill county.
the reclamation requirements, SMCRA mandates that mining
operators must post a performance bond covering the land on which
132
mining will be conducted.
This performance bond must be
“sufficient to assure the completion of the reclamation plan” in the
case the reclamation had to be completed by the state or federal
133
government.
2. Non-compliance with SMCRA
Ohio’s laws do not comply with SMCRA’s bonding requirements
in several respects. Ohio’s surface mining regulations, for example,
make the state’s adjustment of reclamation bond amounts
134
discretionary instead of mandatory as required by SMCRA. Ohio’s
regulations also fail to require post-mining discharges to be included
in the reclamation plan, as required by federal regulations under
135
SMCRA.
Finally, Ohio omits the requirement that performance
bond releases be conditioned upon “faithful performance” of the
136
terms of the bond.
Although these inconsistencies may seem minor, the terms of
Ohio’s bonding laws are critically important. SMCRA’s reclamation
bonding program is the heart of the statute’s purpose—to ensure
proper rehabilitation of mine lands—and Ohio’s lax bonding
requirements inhibit the objectives of the federal statute.
3. Federal Inaction
These and other parts of Ohio’s surface mining program have
been out of compliance since its inception in 1982, despite SMCRA’s
statutory requirement that OSM ensure that all state programs
137
comply with the law. In May 2005, OSM did initiate proceedings,
pursuant to 30 C.F.R. Part 733, in an attempt to force Ohio to update

131. Ohio Department of Natural Resources, A Citizen’s Guide to Mining and Reclamation
in Ohio 12, available at http://www.ohiodnr.com/Portals/11/publications/pdf/citizens_guide.pdf.
132. SMCRA § 509(a), 30 U.S.C. § 1259(a).
133. Id.
134. See generally SMCRA § 509(e), 30 U.S.C. 1259(e); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1513.08(E)
(showing that bonds should be adjusted whenever affected land area increases or decreases).
135. 30 C.F.R. § 780.21(h); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1513.16(F)(8)(a).
136. 30 C.F.R. § 800.11; Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1531.08(A).
137. See OFFICE OF SURFACE MINING ANNUAL SUMMARY OF REGULATORY AND AML
PROGRAMS, 29 (2009), available at http://www.osmre.gov/Reports/EvalInfo/2009/OH09-amlreg.pdf.
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138

its bonding program to comply with SMCRA.
A 733 action
requires OSM to take corrective action to resolve any inconsistencies
with federal law, including the federalization of a state program if
139
necessary.
OSM’s 2005 733 action, however, did not mandate
140
In
compliance and did not lead to federalization of the program.
other words, the 733 process took over 20 years to initiate and has not
fixed Ohio’s program.
Ohio’s surface mining program illustrates just one real-life
example of the inadequacy of cooperative federalism. Cooperative
federalism, as a theory of environmental protection, depends on strict
federal oversight of state programs. The federal backup enforcement
that Congress envisioned would ensure compliance has rarely
materialized in recent years, which has undermined the theories
behind cooperative federalism. Although federal agencies retain the
authority to federalize, or revoke, state programs, they have seldom
done so. EPA has the authority to revoke state NPDES programs
141
under the CWA, for example, but it has never done so. Likewise,
OSM has only once federalized a state SMCRA implementation
142
plan. Further, because Congress does not appropriate money in the
EPA budget for federalizing state programs, EPA would not have
resources to federalize and enforce a state program, even if it wanted
143
to do so.
4. Courts Interpret Federal Obligations as Non-mandatory
One additional challenge inherent in relying on state agency and
federal backup enforcement of environmental law is the discretionary
nature of federal obligations. Several courts have held that federal
agencies might not be required to initiate enforcement procedures,
even when provided with evidence of a violation of law.

138. See id.
139. 30 C.F.R. Part 733.12.
140. OSM 2009 Annual Report, supra note 137, at 7.
141. Whenever a state “is not administering a program approved under [section 402], the
[EPA] Administrator shall withdraw approval for such program.” CWA § 402(c)(3), 33 U.S.C.
1342(c)(3).
142. See generally 49 Fed. Reg. 27325 (July 3, 1984) (showing that Tennessee’s SMCRA
program was federalized by OSM in 1984).
143. See Kenneth M. Murchison, Learning from More Than Five-and-a-Half Decades of
Federal Water Pollution Control Legislation: Twenty Lessons for the Future, 32 B.C. ENVTL.
AFF. L. REV. 527, 594-95 (2005) (“EPA can revoke a state's authority to administer the
[NPDES program] but Congress has not funded or staffed the federal agency to administer the
programs when states fail. As a result, EPA never has revoked a state's authority to administer
the [NPDES] program when a state has failed to perform its obligations.”).
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The CWA contains language requiring agencies to investigate
and remedy violations of its terms. The statute states that “whenever,
on the basis of any information available to him, the Administrator
finds that any person is in violation . . . he shall issue an order
144
requiring such person to comply.” This language clearly appears to
require agency investigation and enforcement.
Some courts, however, have held that agency enforcement
actions are discretionary, even when shown evidence of noncompliance. For example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eight
Circuit, in Dubois v. Thomas, held that the Director of EPA does not
have a duty to investigate violations of the CWA when shown
145
evidence of a violation.
The court reached this holding after
146
applying a Chevron analysis and determining that it would be
147
unfeasible for an agency to investigate all alleged violations.
The
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, moreover, has held that the
148
Director only has this duty when a finding of a violation is made.
D. The Failure of Cooperative Federalism & The Necessity of Citizen
Enforcement
Cooperative federalism inherently allows a “race to the bottom”
149
with regard to lax enforcement, setting up what has been called a
150
“perverse” regulatory scheme. States do not have incentives, in the
form of federal dollars, to enforce the laws, and, at the same time they
face economic and political pressure to weaken regulations.
Meanwhile, the federal government is unable or unwilling to exercise
its backup enforcement power. Therefore, the cooperative federalist

144. CWA § 309(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a) (2006).
145. Dubois v. Thomas, 820 F.2d 943, 948 (1987).
146. A “Chevron analysis” refers to the Supreme Court’s doctrine of deference given to
administrative agencies when interpreting and implementing statutes. See Chevron v. Natural
Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
147. In Dubois, the court held that the administrator’s decision is “entitled to a high degree
of judicial deference.” Dubois, 820 F.2d at 948. In its holding, the court noted that EPA should
not be required to investigate each allegation because it does not have the resources to do so:
EPA should not “be compelled to expend its limited resources investigating multitudinous
complaints irrespective of the magnitude of their environmental significance. As a result, EPA
would be unable to investigate efficiently and effectively those complaints that EPA, in its
expertise, considers to be the most egregious violations of the [CWA].” Id.
148. Council of Commuter Orgs. v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 683 F.2d 663, 671–72 (2d Cir.
1982).
149. See Glickman, supra note 25, at 737.
150. Id. at 719.
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model relies on states to enforce the laws, with no federal “carrots” or
“sticks” to encourage or compel them to do so.
Congress intended that citizen litigation would take up the slack
in times such as these when economic and political obstacles made
government enforcement ineffective, and unable to enforce the laws.
Today provides just such a situation, and citizens must be allowed and
encouraged to participate in the enforcement of the laws that protect
their health and natural resources. Recent history supports—and the
nation’s deepening economic crisis reinforces—our argument that we
cannot rely on the cooperative federalist enforcement model to
ensure compliance with environmental laws.
III. COURT-CREATED BARRIERS TO CITIZEN ENFORCEMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
Part I of this article analyzed the text, structure, and legislative
history of federal environmental statutes to argue that Congress
intended citizen litigation to be a meaningful supplement to
government enforcement of the laws. Indeed, it showed that
legislators understood the vulnerabilities of the cooperative federalist
model and included citizen suit provisions to allow citizens the
opportunity to ensure that environmental laws were followed. Part II
then explained how these vulnerabilities have manifested themselves,
resulting in a failure of cooperative federalism. By referencing
current challenges that inhibit agency enforcement, Part II
highlighted the need for effective citizen litigation to supplement a
failed federalist enforcement regime.
Now, in Part III, we seek to expose the fundamental challenges
standing in the way of necessary public enforcement of environmental
law. This part examines the legal doctrines and court decisions which
prevent citizen access to the courts. Specifically, we address the four
major court-created issues that act as either disincentives or outright
barriers to citizen litigation. This part begins with a discussion of
courts’ interpretation of fee-shifting clauses in environmental statutes.
Next, we examine the Supreme Court’s standing jurisprudence and
recent federal court interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment, two
issues that act as fundamental barriers to citizen enforcement of
environmental laws pursuant to citizen suit provisions. Finally, this
part examines the “diligent prosecution” bar to citizen litigation.
The first legal issue we address—judicial interpretation of feeshifting clauses—currently acts as a deterrent to public participation.
The final three legal issues we analyze—standing, the Eleventh
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Amendment bar, and the diligent prosecution preemption—serve as
direct barriers to citizen litigation. Each of these issues acts as courtcreated barrier that must be resolved to allow meaningful citizen
participation in environmental enforcement.
A. Fees & Costs: Which Parties May Recover?
The first court-created barrier to effective citizen litigation is the
judicial interpretation of the fee-shifting provisions in environmental
151
statutes.
All citizen suit provisions contain litigation expenses
clauses, which allow one party to recover its litigation expenses from
the other “whenever the court determines such award is
152
appropriate.”
However, the interpretation of this phrase—
“whenever . . . appropriate”—has been the subject of much debate,
the outcome of which affects the role citizens are able to play in
environmental enforcement.
As we discussed in Part I, Congress included these costs
provisions in environmental statutes as a novel device to encourage
citizen action, and their interpretation can provide either an incentive
153
or a disincentive to citizen litigation. Fee-shifting clauses allow nonprofit organizations and private citizens to commence legal actions
with some assurance that they will recover their expenses if they
prevail. One commentator has written that without attorneys’ fees
provisions, citizens would likely be “unable to enforce environmental
154
legislation because the costs of litigation are too high.” The clauses
provide a positive incentive to bring meritorious claims, while at the
same time dissuading frivolous lawsuits, for which no court would
grant cost recovery to a plaintiff.
1. The “Appropriate Standard”
When drafting the attorneys’ fees clauses in citizen suit
provisions, Congress broke with the legal tradition in this country.
The general rule in American law is that both parties bear their own
155
litigation expenses, regardless of the outcome.
Most citizen suit
151. We use the terms “costs,” “litigation expenses” and “attorneys’ fees” interchangeably.
See infra Part I.C., for additional discussion of the fee-shifting clauses in citizen suit provisions.
152. See, e.g., CAA § 304(d), 42 U.S.C. 7604(d) (2006).
153. See infra Part I.B.1.d.
154. Florio, supra note 67, at 707–08.
155. See infra Part I.B.1.d (describing the American rule of the common law under which
both parties pay their own litigation costs); see also Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 185
(1976) (“Absent explicit congressional authorization, attorneys' fees are not a recoverable cost
of litigation.”).
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provisions, however, allow plaintiffs (and arguably defendants) to
156
recover their litigation costs when deemed “appropriate” by a court.
These are some of the few statutory exceptions to the American rule,
and Congress was aware of both the novelty and the effects of its
157
decision to use the appropriate standard for fee-shifting.
Congress’ use of the “appropriate standard” in fee-shifting
clauses was not accidental. While some environmental statutes limit
the awards to “prevailing” or “partially prevailing” parties, many do
158
not.
In the former category of clauses, Congress’ intent to limit
awards to prevailing or partially prevailing plaintiffs is unmistakable.
By allowing courts even broader discretion to award attorneys’ fees in
other statutes, Congress intended to encourage public interest
litigation that would advance the interests of the environmental
159
statutes. Thus, Congress believed that even unsuccessful plaintiffs
might, in some circumstances, advance the goals of the statute to the
160
extent that a costs award would be appropriate.
2. Judicial Interpretation of the “Appropriate Standard”
a. The Ruckelshaus Majority
The Supreme Court, however, has narrowly interpreted the text
of fee-shifting clauses as allowing recovery only by prevailing parties.
In Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, the Supreme Court’s conservative wing
read well beyond the text of the CAA to effectively end the
possibility that unsuccessful plaintiffs would ever be able to recover
156. The fee-shifting clauses in about half of the major environmental statutes limit recovery
to “prevailing or substantially prevailing” parties. See, e.g., CWA § 505(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d)
(2006); CERCLA § 310(f), 42 U.S.C. § 9659(f) (2006); Solid Waste Disposal Act § 7002(e), 42
U.S.C. § 6973 (2006). The other half, however, provide only that courts have discretion to
award attorneys’ fees “where appropriate.” See, e.g., CAA § 304(d), 42 U.S.C. § 7604(d) (2006);
SMCRA § 520(d), 30 U.S.C. § 1270(d) (2006); Safe Drinking Water Act § 300j–8(d), 42 U.S.C. §
1449(d) (2006).
157. See infra Part I.B.1.d (arguing that Congress’ novel use of fee-shifting provides
evidence of its intent to facilitate citizen litigation).
158. See, e.g., CAA § 304(d) and SMCRA § 520(d) (stating that costs of litigation may be
awarded “to any party, whenever the court determines such award is appropriate.”).
159. The legislative history of the CAA’s fee-shifting clause shows that its purpose was “to
encourage litigation which will assure proper implementation and administration of the act or
otherwise serve the public interest. The committee did not intend that the court's discretion to
award fees under this provision should be restricted to cases in which the party seeking fees was
the ‘prevailing party.’” H.R. Rep. No. 95–294, at 337 (1977), as reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N
1077, 1416.
160. The original version of CAA § 304(d), in fact, provided that fee awards would be
available “whenever the court determines such action is in the public interest.” 116 Cong. Rec.
32925 (1970).
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161

fees.
The Court determined that “success on the merits must be
obtained before a party becomes eligible for a fee award,” despite
162
Congress’ use of the phrase “whenever . . . appropriate.”
The
majority reached this conclusion by allowing more deference to the
American rule of the common law than to the clear language of the
statute.
The Court’s extra-textual reading of the CAA’s fee-shifting
clause overturned an award of litigation costs to Sierra Club and the
Environmental Defense Fund (EDF), which had not prevailed in the
action but had, according to the court of appeals, nonetheless
163
advanced the interests of the statute. Sierra Club and EDF filed a
petition for review of an EPA rule regulating the discharge of sulfur
164
In a highly technical argument, the
dioxide by new power plants.
165
plaintiffs alleged that the rule violated the CAA.
The court of
appeals, in finding that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover
attorneys’ fees, determined that the case “turns not on whether they
have prevailed in whole or in part, but on whether they have served
166
the goals of the Clean Air Act.”
b. Stevens’ Dissent
Justice Stevens’ dissent in Ruckelshaus is in part a reaffirmation
of the D.C. Circuit’s argument that the case presented the type of
unique situation in which an attorneys’ fee award to an unsuccessful
167
plaintiff would be appropriate. Stevens also argued that the Court’s
interpretation was illogical and contrary to Congress’ evident intent
168
to allow cost recover for a broader class of plaintiffs. Stevens wrote
that the Court chose to make the specious argument “that a statute
which does not refer to ‘prevailing parties’ actually does refer to
169
‘prevailing parties.’”

161. In Ruckelshaus, the Court was interpreting the fee-shifting clause of CAA § 307(f), 42
U.S.C. § 7606(f), but its reasoning is applicable to § 304(d) and other environmental statues with
“appropriate” clauses. Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 682 (1983).
162. Id.
163. The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held that, even though Sierra Club was not
successful on the merits, “this is an ‘appropriate’ case for the court to award attorneys' fees.”
Sierra Club v. Gorsuch, 672 F.2d 33, 34 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 38.
167. Ruckelshaus, 463 U.S. at 702.
168. Id.
169. Id.
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3. The Effects of a Narrow Interpretation of “Appropriate”
The Court’s strict adherence to the American rule will decrease
the effectiveness of environmental statutes by upsetting the incentives
to litigate that Congress intended and drafted. It is important for
170
courts to interpret “appropriate” broadly, as allowing recovery for
non-prevailing plaintiffs who nonetheless advance the public interest.
a. Discouraging Necessary Citizen Action
Most significantly, the Ruckelshaus ruling may have the effect of
dissuading essential public activism. Even when an environmental
group is unsuccessful in its litigation, courts nonetheless rely on its
scientific research and legal work to reach a decision. Without the
work of environmental organizations to analyze the law and science,
and condense and package that information, courts would often be
unable to make informed decisions in environmental cases.
For example, Sierra Club, an organization with massive resources
and technical staff, spends millions of dollars on research and
171
technical analysis to support its litigation each year.
Courts often
rely on environmental plaintiffs to provide the analysis necessary for
172
a decision. Even if an environmental group such as Sierra Club is
unsuccessful in its litigation, courts may nonetheless rely on its
scientific research and legal work to reach a decision. For example,
due to the complex nature of the CAA case that engendered the
Ruckelshaus decision, the court was “totally dependent upon Sierra
173
Club to brief and advocate” its position.
b. Encouraging Evasive Settlements: “Strategic Capitulation”
The ambiguity surrounding the “appropriate” standard also
encourages defendants to settle cases with the government
prematurely so as to preempt attorneys’ fees awards to plaintiffs.
Defendants who believe they are on the losing end of a citizen suit,
for example, may attempt to “moot” the case—and avoid paying the

170. See infra Part I.B.1.ii.
171. Sierra Club’s annual budget is approximately $100 million. Traci Watson, Sierra Club
Could Add Immigration to Green Agenda, USA TODAY, Mar. 7, 2004, at 3A.
172. For example, “Public officials and agencies such as the EPA are prevented from closely
policing the environmental regulation system due to inadequate funding, staff, or expertise.”
Further, “the agencies may be under political pressure which prevents it from aggressively
regulating those agencies it oversees, and the violator may be the government itself.” Nathan A.
Steimel, Congress Should Define “Prevailing Party” to Ensure Citizen Suits Remain Effective, 11
MO. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 282, 285 (2004).
173. Gorsuch, 672 F.2d at 41.

Reisinger_final_cpcxns.doc

Winter 2010

2/25/2010 3:06:50 PM

ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT

33

plaintiff’s costs—by agreeing to some sort of a settlement. Such a
settlement may even come in the form of actually providing the
requested relief. Catherine Albiston and Laura Nielson refer to this
174
type of maneuver by defendants as “strategic capitulation.”
This
kind of maneuvering, or gamesmanship, allows defendants to “toy
with” plaintiffs and drain the litigation funds of public interest
organizations.
2. The Specter of Attorneys’ Fees for Defendants
The uncertain status of the interpretation of fee-shifting clauses
and the “appropriate” rule also leaves open the possibility for
defendants’ cost recovery. The legislative history makes clear that
Congress intended courts to have the discretion to award fees to a
broad class of plaintiffs, and some have suggested that defendants
should also be able to recover.
Defendants often argue that the “appropriate” standard allows
them to recover when determined by a court to be appropriate. The
prevailing defendants in Citizens for a Better Environment v. Chicago
Steel, for example, argued that they were entitled to litigation costs
175
because their litigation advanced the public interest.
The steel
company argued that courts should look to whether a particular
defendant increased the court’s understanding of the statute in
176
question to determine whether defendants may recover.
Defendant cost recovery, however, was not intended by the
drafters and would serve little public purpose. It is not necessary to
prevent frivolous environmental litigation because two deterrents
already serve this function. First, it is unlikely that any plaintiff
bringing a frivolous lawsuit will prevail or be granted attorneys’ fees
177
by the court. Second, the “frivolous” standard, under which a party
can recover attorneys’ fees when the other brings a frivolous lawsuit,
178
acts as an adequate deterrent to prevent frivolous litigation.
Any
174. Catherine R. Albiston and Laura B. Nielson, The Procedural Attack on Civil Rights:
The Empirical Reality of Buckhannon for the Private Attorney General, 4 (CTR. FOR THE STUDY
OF LAW & SOC’Y JURISPRUDENCE & SOC. POLICY PROGRAM, Working Paper No. 45, 2006),
available at http://repositories.cdlib.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1077&context=csls (defining
“strategic capitulation” as “situations where defendants faced with likely adverse judgments
provide the requested relief in order to moot the case and defeat the plaintiff’s fee petition.”).
175. See Reply Brief for the Petitioner, The Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S.
83, (1998) (No. 96-643).
176. Id.
177. Costs provisions allow recovery only in the court’s discretion “whenever the court
determines such award is appropriate.” CAA § 304(d), 42 U.S.C. § 7604(d) (2006).
178. See supra note 70, for a reference to the “frivolous” standard.
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individual or organization who brings a groundless suit for dilatory or
other nefarious reasons is subject to the Court’s fee shifting
179
standard.
Defendant cost recovery, if achieved, would create a
devastating disincentive for public interest environmental litigation.
Defendant cost recovery would only succeed in placing more fear in
the minds of prospective plaintiffs, decreasing the likelihood that they
will choose to litigate.
3. Congress Can Resolve Ambiguities
Congress recognized and intended the fee-shifting provisions in
the CAA and other environmental statutes to act as a statutory
180
exception to the American rule.
But the intention was always to
provide an incentive for plaintiffs to bring meritorious suits that
advanced the interests of the statute and the cause of environmental
protection. To allow citizen plaintiffs to be successful, the uncertain
judicial interpretation of these critically important provisions must be
resolved. Congress can resolve the ambiguity created by Ruckelshaus
181
by clearly defining the phrase “whenever appropriate.”
B. Standing
The express congressional intent of environmental protection
statutes that contain citizen suit provisions is clearly predicated on the
“citizen attorney general” principle, as discussed earlier in this article.
Justice Scalia’s opinion in the landmark 1992 case Lujan v. Defenders
of Wildlife, however, significantly undermined the real world
182
operation of this principle by placing strict limits on citizen standing.
Soon after the decision, Cass Sunstein ranked the Lujan case as
“among the most important in history in terms of the sheer number”
183
of citizen suits it would invalidate.
Since Lujan, the court has redefined its standing requirements, to
a large degree expanding what might qualify as a sufficient injury.
But although the Court has expanded the types of “injuries in fact”
179. See id.
180. “Congress meant something more by the provision in the Clean Air Act: it intended to
encourage the participation of ‘public interest’ groups in resolving complex technical questions
and important and difficult questions of statutory interpretation, and in monitoring the prompt
implementation of the Act.” Gorsuch, 672 F.2d at 38.
181. See infra Part IV, which provides a legislative solution to clarify the phrase “where . . .
appropriate.”
182. See Lujan, 504 U.S. 555.
183. Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and Article
III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 165 (1992).
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184

that will pass constitutional muster, it has not challenged Lujan’s
fundamental holding: that Congress cannot confer an individualized
185
cause of action for a generalized grievance.
Therefore, as long as
Lujan’s fundamental holding is intact, the utility of citizen suits hangs
in the balance.
This section begins by examining the standing test established by
Lujan and the Court’s subsequent liberalization of Lujan’s rigorous
standing requirements. Finally, we argue that Congress must act to
reaffirm its power and intent to confer an individualized cause of
action to all citizens who wish to enforce environmental laws as
citizen attorneys general.
1. Lujan’s High Bar to Citizen Standing
186
Lujan involved a citizen suit under the Endangered Species Act
in which an environmental group sought to compel the Secretary of
the Interior to take certain actions to protect endangered species
187
abroad. The only injury alleged by the environmentalists was that
the Secretary’s lack of action would cause certain animals, which the
188
plaintiffs hoped to view in the future, to become extinct.
Lujan established the Court’s familiar three part standing test. A
plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) an injury in fact that is concrete and
actual or imminent; (2) that the injury is fairly traceable to the acts of
the defendant; and (3) a showing that it is likely that the injury will be
189
redressed by a decision favorable to the plaintiff.
After applying
this test to the environmental plaintiffs, the Court found that they
190
lacked standing.
The most important standing requirement is the “injury in fact”
prong, which in the severity with which it is expressed in Lujan
directly conflicts with the “citizen attorney general” concept. This
concept anticipates that citizens will sue to enforce a statute when
government has failed to act due to limited resources, a lack of will,
or a contravening policy perspective—even when plaintiffs have not
184. As Professor Chemerinsky explains, a generalized grievance occurs when “a citizen or a
taxpayer [is] concerned with having the government follow the law” not merely for his own
benefit, but for the benefit of society at large. ERWIN CHEMERINKSY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION
91 (5th ed. 2007).
185. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 576–77.
186. Endangered Species Act § 11(g), 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (2006).
187. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 559.
188. Id. at 562.
189. Id. at 560.
190. Id. at 578.
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suffered a unique definitive injury. But Lujan requires a plaintiff to
191
After Lujan, citizens
make a showing of injury that is rigorous.
bringing suit challenging administrative action cannot enforce the
terms of the underlying legislation in question unless they have
suffered a concrete and particularized injury.
a. Scalia’s Separation of Powers Argument
Because a citizen suit challenge is often a generalized grievance,
Lujan effectively destroyed the core of the citizen suit provisions in
congressional actions: the concept that a citizen can be authorized by
congress to enforce the terms of a regulation for the sake of
enforcement and to resolve a generalized grievance.
According to the Lujan court, the inherent conflict between the
“citizen attorney general” concept and the court’s conception of basic
constitutional standing demands is a result of clearly visible Article II
192
independence. The Court rejected a challenge regarding the role of
the Endangered Species Act in foreign countries based on the injury
193
The Court found that “the affiants’
in fact test for standing.
profession of an ‘intent’ to return to the places they had visited before
– where they will presumably, this time, be deprived of the
opportunity to observe animals of the endangered species was simply
194
not enough” to meet the three part test. Such “some day’ intentions
– without any description of concrete plans, or indeed even any
speculation of when some day will be – do not support a finding of the
195
‘actual or imminent’ injury that our cases require.”
At its core,
Lujan relies on the basic separation of powers to justify the extent of

191. The Court asserts that when the plaintiff is not “an object” of the violation, standing
will be “substantially more difficult to establish.” Id. at 561–62. This requirement precludes
most citizen suit challenges, which seek to remedy harms to the environment, but not
necessarily to the individual plaintiff.
192. When Congress confers citizen standing, Scalia writes, they “transfer from the
President to the courts the Chief Executive's most important constitutional duty, to ‘take Care
that the Laws be faithfully executed,’ Art. II, § 3. It would enable the courts, with the
permission of Congress, ‘to assume a position of authority over the governmental acts of
another and co equal department.’ and to become `virtually continuing monitors of the wisdom
and soundness of Executive action.’” Id. at 577 (quoting Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447,
489 (1923)).
193. A plaintiff must suffer 1) “an ‘injury in fact’ – an invasion of a legally protected interest
which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) ‘actual or imminent’; 2) “there must be a causal
connection between the injury and the conduct complained of” and 3) “it must be ‘likely,’ as
opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be ‘redressed by a favorable decision.’”
Lujan, 504 U.S. 560–61.
194. Id. at 564.
195. Id.
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the “injury in fact” requirement. For the Lujan majority, Article III
courts can resolve only those controversies appropriately resolved in
the judicial process, those controversies which are commensurate
196
with the doctrine of standing.
b. No Generalized Right for an Individualized Grievance
Lujan makes an important distinction regarding the character of
a potential plaintiff, and the burden that that plaintiff must carry to
establish standing. According to the Court, if a plaintiff asserts an
injury due to the regulation of (or failure to regulate) another, more
is needed than might be needed to establish standing when a plaintiff
197
is directly regulated. The plaintiffs fail, according to the Court, to
successfully assert standing for a number of reasons. First among
them is the failure to assert an “imminent” injury. Although the
plaintiffs clearly demonstrated an interest in the areas potentially
affected by the federal action, citing previous visits, the Court found
that without express or concrete plans to return, any injury was too
198
speculative.
The Court defends the “imminence” requirement by
stating that it is a necessity where no actual harm has been created
199
and where harm is merely anticipatory.
The “imminence” of an
injury therefore assures at least in part that it can properly be
resolved by the courts.
The Court also makes clear that Congress may not create a
200
general right of citizen enforcement.
To construct this central
argument, the court in Lujan relies on a series of decisions that
involved dismissal of taxpayer suits directed at state and federal
201
expenditures and Congressional actions. It is easy to distinguish the
taxpayer suits from the nature of the Lujan inquiry, however. Lujan
involves a congressionally bestowed Article III option for the

196. Id. at 560.
197. “When, however, as in this case, a plaintiff’s asserted injury arises from the
government’s allegedly unlawful regulation (or lack of regulation) of someone else, much more
is needed…when the plaintiff is not himself the object of the government action of inaction he
challenges, standing is not precluded, but it is ordinarily ‘substantially more difficult’ to
establish.” Id. at 562.
198. Id. at 564.
199. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 565.
200. “We have consistently held that a plaintiff raising only a generally available grievance
about government—claiming only harm to his and every citizen’s interest in proper application
of the Constitution and laws, and seeking relief that no more directly and tangibly benefits him
than it does the public at large—does not state an Article III case or controversy.” Id. at 573–
574.
201. Id. at 575–576.
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resolution of generalized grievances, while the cases referenced by
202
To
the Court largely involve challenges to Congressional actions.
the Court in Lujan, this distinction is irrelevant. Scalia writes that
“Whether the courts were to act on their own, or at the invitation of
Congress, in ignoring the concrete injury requirement described in
our cases, they would be discarding a principle fundamental to the
separate and distinct constitutional role of the Third Branch—one of
the essential elements that identifies those ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies’
that are the business of the courts rather than of the political
203
branches.”
According to the Court, then, the Constitution does not permit
Congress to restrain the actions of the executive by creating a
universal citizen interest in executive officers’ compliance with the
204
law.
Therefore, Lujan stands for the basic proposition that
Congress cannot create an individualized right for a generalized
grievance and that a concrete individualized injury is always required.
2. Expanding Lujan: Laidlaw & “Perception-Based” Injuries
In Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental Services,
Justice Ginsburg, writing for the Court, conducted a standing analysis
which expanded the range of injuries that would give rise to standing
205
in a citizen suit context.
In Laidlaw, an environmental group
brought suit, pursuant to section 505(a) of the CWA, challenging the
legality of discharges from a wastewater treatment facility in South
206
Carolina. The plaintiffs did not allege that the defendant’s activities
created any health risk or environmental harm, only that they feared
207
For example, one member was found to have had
such harm.
standing because she no longer recreated or picnicked in the area of
208
the facility because she feared its harmful environmental effects.
The Court allowed “perception-based” injuries to provide citizen
standing. For the majority of justices, the lack of demonstrable
environmental or health related harm did not negate standing: “The
relevant showing for purposes of Article III standing. . . is not injury
202. In Lujan, Congress had essentially deputized citizens as agents who could enforce the
Endangered Species Act. Litigants in the line of taxpayer suits, however, were not conferred
standing by Congress.
203. Id. at 576.
204. Id. at 577.
205. Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Services, 528 U.S. 167 (2000).
206. Id.
207. Id. at 181–82.
208. Id. at 182.
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209

to the environment but injury to the plaintiff.”
In effect, it was
enough that the plaintiffs merely perceived or feared injury.
Laidlaw represents an important departure from Lujan because
it made Scalia’s particularized injury test definitively less concrete.
Laidlaw allows a citizen plaintiff’s mere concern or fear, if
reasonable, to create a sufficient injury in fact for satisfaction of the
standing requirement.
3. Massachusetts v. EPA
In 2007, Massachusetts v. EPA further reinforced Laidlaw’s core
concept, thus moving the Court’s standing doctrine farther from the
210
The plaintiffs,
rigor of Lujan’s particularized injury requirement.
including the state of Massachusetts, sought to compel EPA to
regulate carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases under the
211
CAA. EPA first challenged the plaintiffs’ standing to sue, arguing
that the plaintiffs lacked standing because the harm alleged—global
warming and its effects—was too widespread for resolution in an
212
Article III court.
To deal with this thorny question, the court
looked to Lujan: “To ensure the proper adversarial presentation,
Lujan holds that a litigant must demonstrate that it has suffered a
concrete and particularized injury that is either actual or imminent,
that the injury is fairly traceable to the defendant, and that it is likely
213
that a favorable decision will redress that injury.”
The Court also discusses the unique nature of the named
214
plaintiff, the state of Massachusetts.
The Court contends that the
state of Massachusetts is unique because of its intent and sovereign
215
duty to protect all of its citizens. As a member of the Union, the
state of Massachusetts has given up some of the basic state functions
that the federal government now enjoys; but it still must work to
ensure that the federal government follows through on those basic

209. Id. at 181.
210. Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
211. Id.
212. Id. at 517.
213. Id.
214. “Only one of the petitioners needs to have standing to permit us to consider the
petition for review . . . We stress here, as did Judge Tatel below, the special position and interest
of Massachusetts. It is of considerable relevance that the party seeking review here is a
sovereign State and not, as it was in Lujan, a private individual.” Id. at 518.
215. Id.
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state functions, including the protection of its citizens from global and
216
international external threats.
The Court first deals with the causation problem. In its brief,
EPA did not try to discredit the causal connection between
217
greenhouse gas emissions and global warming. But EPA did argue
that global warming is a harm that is too large to be addressed by
218
regulation, or by suit. Refusing to justify this argument, the Court
says that EPA overstates its case: “Its argument rests on the
erroneous assumption that a small incremental step, because it is
incremental, can never be attacked in a federal judicial forum. Yet
accepting that premise would doom most challenges to regulatory
action. Agencies, like legislatures, do not generally resolve massive
219
problems in one fell regulatory swoop.” It is easy for the Court to
accept the fact that even if EPA regulated carbon dioxide emissions
in the transportation sector, full relief for the injuries of
Massachusetts would not be created. The Court states that the relief
would be small but nonetheless incremental. Incomplete, incremental
relief, to the Court, is still relief which can be granted by Article III
220
courts.
Massachusetts v. EPA presented the Court with an
221
unprecedented challenge: climate change.
Global climate change,
aside from presenting a redressibility problem, creates another
inherent standing problem under Lujan. If an injury must be
concrete and particular, it would be difficult for any citizen or state to
claim that climate change affects them in a “particular” or “personal
222
and individual way.”
Although the Court does note that
Massachusetts had filed affidavits alleging current and prospective
injury, it does not go into a detailed analysis of the particular nature
223
of Massachusetts’ injury.
The Court nonetheless concludes that
216. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 519.
217. See Brief for the Federal Respondent in Opposition, Massachusetts v. Envt’l Protection
Agency, 594 U.S. 497 (2007) (No. 05-1120).
218. EPA’s argument was that because climate change is a global phenomenon, and the
litigation centers on the regulation of only one sector (transportation), it is clear then that the
regulation of that one sector cannot possibly resolve the potential harm faced by Massachusetts.
See id.
219. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 524.
220. “A reduction in domestic emissions would slow the pace of global emissions increases,
no matter what happens elsewhere.” Id. at 526.
221. For the first time, the Supreme Court was asked to judge the reliability and sufficiency
of the evidence that greenhouse cases cause or contribute to climate change.
222. Id. at 540.
223. Id. at 522.
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Massachusetts “has alleged a particularized injury in its capacity as a
224
landowner.”
4. Roberts’ Dissent & Lujan’s Separation of Powers Analysis
Justice Roberts’ dissent in Massachusetts challenged the
majority’s easy dismissal of the analysis around the “particularized
injury” inquiry. To Roberts, the very concept of global warming is
225
inconsistent with the particularized injury standing requirement.
Additionally, the dissent takes issue with the Court’s discussion of
“imminence,” finding that: “accepting a century-long time horizon
and a series of compounded estimates renders requirements of
226
imminence and immediacy utterly toothless.” This, combined with
disappointed appraisals of the court’s causation and redressability
analysis, leads to the core of the dissent’s objection with the decision,
an objection built upon a principle most wholly articulated in Lujan:
When dealing with legal doctrine phrased in terms of what is ‘fairly’
traceable or ‘likely’ to be redressed, it is perhaps not surprising that
the matter is subject to some debate. But in considering how
loosely or rigorously to define those adverbs, it is vital to keep in
mind the purpose of the inquiry. The limitation of the judicial
power to cases and controversies ‘is crucial in maintaining the
227
tripartite allocation of power set forth in the Constitution.’

This objection is further clarified by Roberts: “the Court’s selfprofessed relaxation of those Article III requirements has caused us
to transgress ‘the proper – and properly limited – role of the courts in
228
a democratic society.’”
For the dissent, then, the core concern is one of constitutional
law and the separation of powers. It is a question of the competency
of an Article III institution to resolve a question that should be born
solely by the executive. This clearly echoes the conclusion in Lujan:
that Congress cannot create an individualized right for a generalized
grievance, that a concrete individualized injury is required. In his
dissent, Roberts indicates why this important: it is a matter of
democratic accountability.

224.
225.
226.
227.
228.

Id.
Id. at 541.
Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 542.
Id. at 547.
Id. at 548–549.
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5. The Precarious Position of Citizen Suits
Lujan stands for the idea that Congress cannot create an
individualized right for a generalized grievance, that a concrete
individualized injury is required. The line of cases since Lujan has
clearly eroded the essential injury-in-fact inquiry, which has in turn
undermined the fundamental conclusion of the case: that a concrete
individualized injury is required. Since Lujan, however, the standing
debate has taken place on Scalia’s terms. The Court has expanded
standing opportunities through strained interpretations of the injury
in fact prong, but it has not reexamined Lujan’s central conclusion:
that Congress cannot create an individualized right for a generalized
grievance. If citizen suits are to be reinvigorated and rehabilitated in
the still-turbulent wake of Lujan, the individualized injury problem
must be solved. Unless the Court changes the frame of the debate—
moving from examinations of the injury in fact parameters to a
fundamental reevaluation of the constitutional competency
argument—then citizens will continue to face standing challenges,
impeding their role as citizen attorneys general.
Additionally, the Court’s more liberal standing rules established
after Lujan, which effectively enable citizen plaintiffs to enforce
environmental laws, are by no means secure. Massachusetts v. EPA
was decided in a 5-4 decision by the justices. Further, two members
of the Laidlaw majority, O’Conner and Rehnquist, have since retired.
These two cases softened the effect of Lujan’s standing requirements
229
to the benefit of public interest litigation.
But the Court’s
conservative bloc—Justices Scalia, Roberts, Alito, and Thomas—now
appears just one vote shy of overturning the liberal reforms made
since Lujan. As we describe in Part IV, Congress is not powerless to
address the precarious state of citizen standing. Congress has the
ability to pass legislation that reaffirms its power and intent to confer
a cause of action to all citizens.
C. Eleventh Amendment
Despite all of the budget cuts facing state agencies, and the
increasing difficulty of enforcing environmental laws, states—
unsurprisingly—do not like to be compelled to enforce those laws.
States act as not only regulators and enforcers of federal
environmental laws, but also play the role of regulated community
229. Massachusetts v. EPA allowed the state to assert a future injury based only on the
threat of climate change, while Laidlaw allowed for a “perception-based” standing. See supra
note 210.
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participants when they own, operate, and construct potentially
polluting facilities like hazardous waste landfills, hospitals, prisons,
airports, roads, and sewage treatment plants on state property that
may violate federal laws. In both capacities, states are often targets of
230
citizen suits.
The three major environmental citizen suit provisions that are
the focus of this article (and for that matter most environmental
citizen suits) contain language invoking the limits of the Eleventh
231
Amendment when suing state officials.
The application of these
limits to the CAA, CWA, and SMCRA case law, however, has been
disparate. And in the case of SMCRA, the judicial interpretation of
the Eleventh Amendment bar has shut many citizens out of the
232
enforcement equation.
1. Sovereign Immunity and its Exceptions
In the landmark case of Chisholm v. Georgia, the Supreme Court
held that Article III courts had jurisdiction to hear suits against states;
states, therefore, were denied complete sovereign immunity from
233
suit.
Chisholm created such an angry reaction from those in
Georgia and other states that Congress felt it had to act to protect
234
Congress quickly proposed the Eleventh
states from suit.
Amendment, directed specifically toward overturning the result in
Chisholm and preventing suits against states by citizens of other
states. But the amendment does not altogether prohibit all suits
235
against states.
The text of the Eleventh Amendment is clear,

230. Hope Babcock, The Effect of the United States Supreme Court’s Eleventh Amendment
Jurisprudence on Clean Water Act Citizen Suits: Muddied Waters, 83 OR. L. REV. 47, 49 (2004).
231. See, e.g., SMCRA §520(a)(2), 30 U.S.C. §1270(a)(2) (2006); CAA § 304(a)(1)(ii),42
U.S.C. §7604(a)(1)(ii) (2006); CWA § 505(a)(1)(ii), 33 U.S.C. 1365(a)(1)(ii) (2006).
232. See Clean Air Council v. Mallory, 226 F.Supp2d 705 (E.D.Pa. 2002) (holding citizen suit
provisions of CAA were intended as a means of private enforcement against state officials
within Eleventh Amendment limits, suit did not amount to expansive intrusion on state
sovereignty interests,and emissions program was a matter of federal law); see also Seminole
Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 75 n.17 (1996) (stating that the CWA is authorized against
states under the Ex Parte Young doctrine).
233. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 420 (1793).
234. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 11 (1890) (“That decision . . . created such a shock of
surprise throughout the country that, at the first meeting of Congress thereafter, the Eleventh
Amendment to the Constitution was almost unanimously proposed, and was in due course
adopted by the legislatures of the States.”). Source generally substantiates the proposition, but
does not mention Georgia directly.
235. See William A. Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A
Narrow Construction of an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather than a Prohibition Against
Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1033, 1054–58 (1983).
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providing that a citizen of one state (or a citizen of another country)
236
The
cannot sue one of the United States in federal court.
interpretation of the amendment, however, has been decidedly less
clear.
For most of the nineteenth century, the Court followed the
interpretation of Chief Justice Marshall, holding that the Amendment
237
was limited to its words.
However, after Reconstruction, the
Supreme Court substantially broadened its interpretation of the
Amendment to provide complete sovereign immunity for states—
238
including immunity from suits brought by its own citizens.
The
Court justified this interpretation by opining that “[t]he fundamental
239
rule of which the Amendment is but an exemplification” and that
“[m]anifestly, we cannot . . . assume that the letter of the Eleventh
Amendment exhausts the restrictions upon suits against
240
nonconsenting States.”
Yet, notwithstanding the expansion of immunity for states, the
Supreme Court has rationalized three exceptions to the states’
sovereign immunity: “abrogation,” “waiver,” and the Ex parte Young
doctrine. The first two exceptions are of little relevance to the citizen
suit provisions to enforce state compliance with federal law mandates.
Therefore, we make short work of those exceptions below, and direct
our focus to the Ex parte Young doctrine.
a. Abrogation
The abrogation of sovereign immunity only exists if Congress
241
expresses its unequivocal intention to do so and is pursuant to a

236. “The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in
law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another
State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. CONST. AMEND. XI.
237. See Osborn v. Bank of the U.S., 22 U.S. 738, 857–58 (1824).
238. Expansion of the doctrine as a formal holding began with Hans, 134 U.S. at 19; see also
In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443 (1887) (“This historic statement justifies the following conclusions: (1)
It shows that by the Constitution makers it was ordained that the original Constitution should
not be construed (as it had been in Chisholm v. Georgia) to extend to any suit by a citizen of
one State, or foreign subjects against a State. (2) If any of these suits were those of citizens
against his own State (as it may have from the names of the plaintiffs in Huger v. South Carolina
and Grayson v. Virginia) they, with those against a State by parties not citizens thereof, were
equally condemned by this amendment.”).
239. Ex parte New York, 256 U.S. 490, 497 (1921).
240. Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322 (1934).
241. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 55 (“Congress’ intent to abrogate the States' immunity
from suit must be obvious from ‘a clear legislative statement.’”) (quoting Blatchford v. Native
Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 786 (1991)).
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242

valid grant of Constitutional authority. Congress obtains its power
to draft laws for the protection of the environment based on the
243
Commerce Clause, a very important Constitutional provision.
However, courts have, to date, only recognized the enforcement
provision of the Fourteenth Amendment (Section 5) as a
244
constitutional basis for Congressional abrogation.
b. Waiver
Although a state can also waive its Eleventh Amendment
immunity and consent to be sued, the parameters put on waiver have
left it an unavailable avenue around sovereign immunity. A state
may waive its immunity by statute or by unequivocally expressing its
245
intention to do so. But most obviously, states—like people—do not
like being sued and will rarely, if ever, voluntarily shed their
immunity. Some have argued that by agreeing to enforce federal
246
standards, a state has waived its sovereign immunity.
However,
such a novel argument would suppose the validity of constructive
waiver of a constitutional right, which has not yet been accepted by
the courts.
c. Ex parte Young Doctrine
The most important exception to state sovereign immunity, and
the saving grace for environmental citizen suits against state officials,
is the Ex parte Young doctrine. The Supreme Court in Ex parte
Young held that a federal court has jurisdiction over a suit against a
state officer to enjoin official actions that violate federal law, even if
247
the state itself is immune. The Ex parte Young exception “create[s]
an anomaly” where the enforcement of a statute is ‘state action’
under the Fourteenth Amendment, yet an ‘individual wrong’ under
248
the Eleventh Amendment. “In determining whether the doctrine of
242. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 756 (1999).
243. U.S. CONST art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
244. “We have held also that in adopting the Fourteenth Amendment, the people required
the States to surrender a portion of the sovereignty that had been preserved to them by the
original Constitution, so that Congress may authorize private suits against nonconsenting States
pursuant to its § 5 enforcement power.” Alden, 527 U.S. at 756.
245. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238–240 (1985).
246. “’Congress required the states to agree to submit to federal jurisdiction . . . to review
their non-discretionary actions for conformity with federal law’ and therefore that the State
‘waived its immunity.’” Bragg v. W.Va. Coal Ass’n, 248 F.3d 275, 298 (4th Cir. 2001).
247. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159–60 (1908).
248. CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS, § 48 (4th ed. 1983). See also
Idaho v. Coeur d’ Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 288 (1997) (holding that the premise of the
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Ex parte Young avoids an Eleventh Amendment bar to a suit, a court
need only conduct a ‘straightforward inquiry into whether [the]
complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief
249
properly characterized as prospective.’”
Thus, citizen
environmental enforcement actions to enjoin a violation of federal
250
law by a state fall well within the bounds of Ex parte Young.
Professor Hope Babcock addressed and analyzed the four ways
in which federal courts have narrowed the effectiveness of Ex parte
Young doctrine to protect the integrity of federal environmental
citizen enforcement suits: 1) the scope of the doctrine; 2) the scope of
the relief; 3) the nature and type of the relief; and 4) the character of
251
the law under which the suit has been brought. Professor Babcock
goes into great detail on these four, and her analysis sparks alarm for
the future of citizen suit enforcement against states. This article
focuses on the fourth limitation, and the Fourth Circuit’s recent
opinion in Bragg v. West Virginia Coal Association. This decision
may effectively turn federal environmental laws into state laws, and
forever block citizens from forcing states to comply with minimum
federal standards through citizen suits.
2. Ex Parte Young and the Bragg Barrier to Citizen Enforcement
In Bragg v. West Virginia Coal Association, citizens of West
Virginia challenged the issuance of permits for mountaintop removal
252
mining, alleging that the impacts of the mining practice violated
253
SMCRA. The citizen complaint alleged that the Director of West
Virginia’s Division of Environmental Protection violated his non254
The
discretionary duties under SMCRA by granting the permits.
Southern District of West Virginia found for the plaintiffs, enjoining
255
the state to make certain findings before issuing mining permits.
doctrine is based on the legal fiction that states cannot authorize its officials to violate federal
law).
249. Verizon Md. Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 535 U.S. 635, 645 (2002).
250. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 75, n.17.
251. Babcock, supra note 230.
252. Mountaintop removal mining, in which the tops of mountains and hills are literally
blown away to reach the coal seams below, is considered to be an especially brutal
environmental practice. See 30 C.F.R. § 824.11 (“The activities involve the mining of an entire
coal seam running through the upper fraction of a mountain, ridge, or hill, by removing all of
the overburden and creating a level plateau or gently rolling contour with no highwalls
remaining.”).
253. Bragg, 248 F.3d at 285.
254. Id. at 286.
255. Id.
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On appeal, the Fourth Circuit concluded that SMCRA, although
a federal statute, becomes state law once West Virginia’s SMCRA
256
program is approved by OSM.
The court found that, after it is
approved by the federal government, West Virginia’s SMCRA
program loses its federal characteristics, which makes the state
257
immune from a federal citizen suit under the Eleventh Amendment.
To reach this novel result, the Fourth Circuit applied the
Supreme Court’s ruling in Pennhurst State School & Hospital v.
258
Halderman (“Pennhurst II”). The Court in Pennhurst II held that
citizens cannot sue state officials in federal court for violations of
259
state law, regardless of the nature of relief sought.
Likewise,
because the Ex Parte Young exception to sovereign immunity does
not apply to violations of state law, Bragg held that West Virginia was
260
therefore immune from suit.
In defining SMCRA minimum standards as state law, the Bragg
court emphasized the “extraordinary deference given to the states” in
261
enforcing SMCRA. SMCRA allows states to enact their own laws
incorporating minimum standards, as well as any more stringent, but
262
not inconsistent, standards they might choose.
The Bragg court
emphasized that SMCRA granted to states “exclusive jurisdiction
263
over the regulation of surface mining” within its borders and that if
a state fails to submit a program for approval, the program is not
approved, or the Secretary of the Interior withdraws the approval
because of inadequacy of the program, exclusive jurisdiction resides
264
in the federal government. The conclusion of the court is that there
265
is either federal jurisdiction or state jurisdiction—not both.
256. See id. at 295.
257. “[E]ven though the States ultimately remain subject to SMCRA, the Act grants
"exclusive jurisdiction" to a primacy State (one with an approved program), thereby
conditionally divesting the federal government of direct regulatory authority.” Id. at 294.
258. 465 U.S. 89 (1984).
259. Id. at 106 (holding that the Ex parte Young doctrine is “inapplicable in a suit against
state officials on the basis of state law.”).
260. “In this case, the federal interest in adjudicating the dispute is undoubtedly stronger, as
the rights at issue were created by the State pursuant to a federal invitation to implement a
program that met certain minimum standards set by Congress. Moreover, the federal
government, through the Secretary's oversight role, retains an important modicum of control
over the enforcement of that State law.” Bragg, 248 F.3d at 296.
261. Id. at 293.
262. Id. at 288. (states may adopt “more stringent, but not inconsistent” standards) (citing 30
U.S.C. § 1255(b)).
263. SMCRA § 503(a), 30 U.S.C. §1253(a) (2006).
264. See 30 U.S.C. §1254(a) (2006).
265. Bragg, 248 F.3d at 289.
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3. The Fourth Circuit’s Flawed Reasoning
The Bragg decision was an unprecedented interpretation of the
sovereign immunity doctrine. The Fourth Circuit even acknowledged
that the state’s primacy is always subject to revocation, and that the
federal government still oversees a delegated state program and has
266
an obligation to inspect and monitor the operations of the state.
What the Bragg court missed, however, is that the existence of
continuing federal oversight of primacy state programs stands for the
proposition that there is not a clear “drop off” of federal jurisdiction.
The enforcement of federal minimum standards is an obligation of
267
states with approved programs. Therefore, citizen attorneys general
continue to hold authority to enforce those same minimums through
citizen suits.
The Fourth Circuit recognized that “rather than asking the States
to enforce the federal law, Congress through SMCRA invited the
States to create their own laws, which would be of ‘exclusive’ force in
268
the regulation of surface mining within their borders.”
Yet, what
the court failed to recognize is that Congress’s “invitation” to the
states was an invitation to enforce federal minimum standards, not
merely a request to abide by nonbinding model legislation. In
instances where a state is not yet meeting the federal regulatory floor,
enforcement of the minimum standards lies with the federal
269
government and citizens.
What the court failed to comprehend is
the practical matter that in states like West Virginia and Ohio, and
any other coal producing state, the so-called state law would not exist
270
but for Congress’ “invitation” to enforce SMCRA.
The fragile balance between federal and states’ rights is
maintained through adherence to the doctrine of sovereign immunity,
and “it is difficult to think of a greater intrusion on state sovereignty
than when a federal court instructs state officials on how to conform

266. Id. (citing 30 U.S.C. §§ 1253(a)).
267. See 30 U.S.C. § 1255(b) (2006).
268. Bragg, 248 F.3d at 297 (emphasis added).
269. One of Bragg’s progeny in the Third Circuit noted that when an “element of an
approved state program is inconsistent with – i.e. less stringent than – the federal objective it
implements,” it is thus federal law and federally enforceable. See Pennsylvania Fed’n of
Sportsmen’s Club v. Hess, 297 F.3d 310, 324 (3rd Cir. 2002).
270. One reason for the legislation was to make sure that sellers of coal in different states
will not be used to undermine the ability of the states to improve and maintain adequate
standards, and finding that currently there were a substantial number of acres of un-reclaimed
lands which have posed negative impacts and that lead to socio-economic and environmental
costs. See SMCRA § 101(g–h), 30 U.S.C. § 1201(g–h) (2006).
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their conduct to state law.” Yet Bragg takes those concepts a step
too far when it finds that the state’s dignity would be impaired if
federal citizen enforcement were permitted in the context of a state
272
law. According to the court, “[t]hat dignity interest does not fade
into oblivion merely because a State’s law is enacted to comport with
a federal invitation to regulate within certain parameters and with
273
federal agency approval.”
However, allowing citizens to use federal courts to enforce
minimum federal standards does not deprive the state of its ability to
tailor its regulatory scheme to their unique terrain, climate and
274
physical characteristics.
States can continue to develop and
implement a program to achieve the purposes of SMCRA as they
have for over thirty years. However, whether the state’s regulations
or enforcement comport to that of the federally mandated minimum
standards is a question solely of federal law, and thus can be enforced
by a citizen suit.
4. Practical Implications of Bragg
The Bragg decision has the obvious effect of preventing SMCRA
suits from compelling state officials to enforce the federal statute.
Bragg’s implications, however, extend more broadly. The decision
could prevent all potential citizen litigants from challenging state
action that violates a federal environmental law.
a. Preventing SMCRA Citizen Suits
The first effect of the Bragg court’s Eleventh Amendment
jurisprudence will be to keep many SMCRA citizen suits out of
federal court in a region where enforcement is necessary. Federal law
has been ignored and violated by West Virginia for more than a
275
decade.
To the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
West Virginia, “The results are obvious: an immense state liability
incurred by the mine operators, but borne by the taxpayers, and on276
going pollution of the State’s streams.”
Bragg’s expansionist view

271. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman , 465 U.S. 89, 106 (1984).
272. Bragg, 248 F.3d at 296.
273. Id. at 297; cf. United States Dep’t of Energy v. Ohio, 503 U.S. 607, 625 (1992) (noting
that state-law penalties approved by the Environmental Protection Agency and supplanting the
Clean Water Act did not “arise under federal law” as meant in 28 U.S.C. § 1331).
274. See 30 U.S.C. § 1201(f) (2006).
275. West Virginia Highlands Conservancy v. Norton, 147 F. Supp. 2d 474, 481 (S.D. W.Va.
2001).
276. Id.
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of the Eleventh Amendment not only has the effect of keeping citizen
suits out of court, but also of preventing the enforcement of
environmental laws.
The decision in Bragg has been held as controlling also in a Third
Circuit case, eerily similar to the facts and regulatory predicament
Ohio faces in dealing with enforcement of the bonding requirements
277
of SMCRA.
In Pennsylvania Federation of Sportsmen’s Clubs v.
Hess, environmental and conservation groups brought an action
against the Secretary of the Pennsylvania Department of
Environmental Protection under SMCRA, alleging a failure to
perform duties concerning enforcement of its reclamation bonding
278
program. The Court ruled that because Pennsylvania is a primacy
state, “OSM has relinquished its regulatory authority and regulation
279
has become a matter of state law.”
b. Denial of Federal Court Jurisdiction
The denial of federal court as a venue for citizen suits resulting
from Bragg has several adverse effects for citizen litigants, each
decreasing the potential for effective public enforcement of
environmental laws.
i. Loss of Fee-shifting Opportunities
First, without access to the federal courts, citizens could lose the
opportunity to recover litigation costs. As explained at length in this
article, one of the biggest incentives for a citizen litigant to bring an
enforcement suit is the assurance that he will be able to recover
280
attorneys’ fees if successful.
Such fee shifting is rarely offered by
state courts, however. Therefore, denying citizens the right to
enforce federal environmental standards in federal court, pursuant to
federal statutes, removes an important incentive to bring suit.
ii. Less Impartial Decision-making
Second, unlike federal court where the President appoints judges
281
to life terms, many state judges are elected.
Local politics is thus

277. See infra Part II.C.1.a.
278. 297 F.3d 310 (3rd Cir. 2002).
279. Id. at 324.
280. See infra Part III.A for a discussion of fee-shifting clauses in citizen suit provisions.
One commentator has gone so far as to say that federal citizen suits are “made possible” by the
inclusion of fee shifting provisions. Florio, supra note 67, at 707.
281. In total, thirty-nine states elect judges at some level, http://www.pbs.org/
wgbh/pages/frontline/teach/american/justice (last visited Dec. 30, 2009).
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thrust into the center of environmental enforcement. As states
continue to try to “level the playing field” for business, the state court
becomes a less than hospitable place for a citizen plaintiff to assert his
right to enforce environmental mandates. Finally, many states have
their own version of sovereign immunity from actions in state court as
282
well.
If the Bragg decision stands, transforming federal law into
state law for primacy states, the cloak of sovereign immunity could be
used as a complete bar to citizen suit enforcement of federal
environmental standards against recalcitrant state agencies.
c. The Broader Threat to Citizen Enforcement
The federal sovereign always carries the right to sue its state
283
subordinate for a violation of a federal standard; therefore, the
citizen attorney general standing in the shoes of the sovereign also
possesses an equal right. However, as more and more states gain
primacy, the Eleventh Amendment as interpreted by the Fourth
Circuit could lead to a systematic dismantling of citizen enforcement
in a time when it is needed most. Although the Fourth Circuit has
been the only circuit to address the issue, broadly applying the Fourth
Circuit’s doctrine would bar citizens from enforcing the federal
minimums of any environmental statute.
D. “Diligent Prosecution”
The legislative history of the CAA, used routinely by courts to
determine the intent of all citizen enforcement provisions, indicates a
balance between two very important considerations. First, the
legislative history shows that Congress wanted citizen enforcement to
provide more and better enforcement by “prodding the government”
to take action against violators and empowering the citizens to take
284
action when the government failed to respond.
Second, this
authority was qualified to make sure that citizen enforcement “did
not unduly disrupt or conflict with government enforcement or harass
285
violators.”
282. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. [BB T.1-OH] § 2744 (2009).
283. “Sovereign immunity does not, for example, prevent the U.S. itself from bringing suit
against an unconsenting state to ensure compliance with federal law.” Bragg, 248 F.3d (citing
United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621, 644–45 (1892)).
284. Jeffrey G. Miller, Overlooked Issues in the “Diligent Prosecution” Citizen Suit
Provision, 10 WID. L. SYMP. 63, 70–71 (2003) (citing Senator Hart’s statement commenting that
the notice would have the effect of “prodding governmental enforcement. See 116 Cong. Rec.
33,104 (1970) (statement of Sen. Hart)).
285. Id. at 70.
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Unfortunately, however, courts’ interpretation of these
provisions has been inconsistent. This section examines the “diligent
prosecution” clauses and explains why the absence of a clear
definition of their terms harms citizen litigants.
1. Balancing Government & Citizen Enforcement
The balance between government and citizen enforcement in the
CAA was struck through the incorporation of the notice, delay, and
286
preclusion provisions..
Under the CAA, “[n]o action may be
commenced if the Administrator or State has commenced and is
diligently prosecuting a civil action in a court of the United States or a
State to require compliance with the standard, limitation, or order, but
in any such action in a court of the United States any person may
287
intervene as a matter of right.” Thus, if the state has the resources
and the political will to prosecute a violator that has been brought to
its attention through a citizen’s 60-day notice, the state should have
the first bite at the apple.
As the language implies, and the Courts have interpreted, the
ability of the state to have the first prosecution right does not bar a
citizen action once the state merely files suit. Beyond the statute’s
grant of intervention to a citizen in the state’s case as a matter of
right, there are four important caveats to the state’s prosecution
barring a citizen action: 1) the prosecution must be commenced
before the citizen files; 2) the state must be diligent in its prosecution;
3) the state’s action must be in a court; and 4) the state’s action must
288
be meant to require compliance.
While the diligent prosecution bar’s line of case law is not a
direct assault on citizen enforcement actions, the case law does bring
to light the unnecessary ambiguities in the provisions. We next focus
on two of those ambiguities which courts could use as a barrier to
citizen enforcement unless there is quick and decisive clarification by
Congress.
2. What is “Diligent” & What Constitutes “Compliance”?
The first and most obvious question is: what constitutes
“diligent” prosecution of a violation? The dictionary definition of
289
diligent is “careful; attentive; persistent in doing something.” This
286.
287.
288.
289.

See 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b) (2006).
CAA § 304(b)(1)(B), 40 U.S.C. §7604(b)(1)(B) (2006) (emphasis added).
See 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b) (2006).
th
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 469 (7 ed. 1999).
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definition provides little help in the context of litigation, as it is
qualitative and subjective, leaving too much to the whims of the
court. One qualification to the diligent prosecution bar is the
requirement that the state enforcement action must be one calculated
to “require compliance.” Courts, in determining the scope of the
term “diligent” look to whether an action is capable of or calculated
290
to lead to compliance.
Unfortunately, courts have not reached a consensus on what
actions are capable of leading to compliance. Questions still persist as
to what is meant to require compliance; whether a preclusive action
by the state is meant to require compliance; and whether the
government’s prosecution should enjoin the violation or serve as a
deterrent from future violations. The last question, of course is the
most important as it determines what is meant by compliance and
whether an action leads to compliance.
3. Who Bears the Burden of Proof?
To make matters worse, courts have placed citizen plaintiffs with
the burden of proving that the state’s prosecution is not diligent.
Courts have held that diligence will be presumed, and, where an
agency has specifically addressed concerns of analogous citizen suit,
291
“deference to an agency’s plan of attack is particularly favored.” It
is unreasonable to expect a citizen plaintiff, whose chief concern is
protecting the environmental and human health of his community, to
effectively rebut the presumption that every state action toward a
defendant was capable of requiring compliance.
Plaintiffs’ burden to rebut the presumption of diligence
juxtaposes defendants’ burden to persuade the court that a case is
292
293
precluded by the doctrines of mootness and res judicata.
The

290. See St. Bernard Citizens for Envtl. Quality, Inc. v. Chalmette Ref., L.L.C., 500 F. Supp.
2d. 592, 606 (E.D. La. 2007), reconsideration denied, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81829 (E.D. La.
2007) (holding that “the ‘diligent prosecution’ analysis should look to whether government
enforcement action is capable of requiring compliance with the Clean Air Act and is in good
faith calculated to do so.”).
291. Am. Canoe Ass’n v City of Attalla, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25057, at *6 (N.D. Ala.
2003).
292. See Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Services, 528 U.S. 167, 189 (2000) (quoting
U.S. v. Concentrated Phosphate Export Assn., 393 U.S. 199, 203 (1968) (“A case might become
moot if subsequent events made it absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could
not reasonably be expected to recur.”)).
293. See Worrie v. Boze, 95 S.E.2d 192, 196–197 (Va. 1956) (“One who asserts the defense
of res adjudicata has the burden of proving that the very point or question was in issue and
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doctrines of mootness and res judicata work as the common law
equivalent of the statutory preclusive device of the diligent
prosecution bar. All three doctrines essentially state that if a decision
on the matter has been made, then allowing the case to continue
would be purely academic or at the most, wasteful of the court’s
resources.
Courts generally do not presume that a given case is res judicata
or moot. Thus shifting the burden for essentially the same reasoning
and outcome is contrary to established doctrines. Such burden
shifting also stands as a disincentive to citizens filing suit if most of
their resources will be spent rebutting deferential presumptions.
4. Inconsistency of Interpretation Between Acts
There is also a distinct and unnecessary divergence between the
CWA and the CAA as to the boundaries of the term “diligent.”
Under the CWA, the courts have created a higher barrier for the
citizen suit by stating that “the presumption [of diligence] is not
rebutted merely by showing that the settlement in the state action was
less burdensome to the discharger than that demanded in the citizen
294
suit.”
Under the CAA, however, at least one court expressed
opposition to the incredible deference to the government in the
context of citizen enforcement, going as far as saying that “[c]omplete
deference to agency enforcement strategy, adopted and implemented
internally and beyond public control, requires a degree of faith in
bureaucratic energy and effectiveness that would be alien to common
295
experience.” The court in Gardeski v. Colonial Sand & Stone thus
chose to examine the specifics of state enforcement that would enable
296
citizens to challenge state enforcement that appears to be lax. Such
divergence in interpretation between environmental statutes is
unproductive. Congress can resolve these ambiguities by placing the
burden of proving diligence in the hands of the citizen suit defendant.
The courts have not technically created a barrier to citizen
enforcement through their various interpretations of the terms
“diligent” or “to require compliance,” but the ambiguity left by
Congress could stand to unnecessarily keep valid citizen suits out of
determined in the former suit.”); see also Commonwealth ex. rel. Gray v. Johnson, 7 Va. App.
614, 618 (1989).
294. Conn. Fund for the Env’t v. Contract Plating Co., 631 F.Supp. 1291 (D. Conn. 1986).
295. Gardeski v. Colonial Sand & Stone Co., 501 F.Supp. 1159, 1168 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
296. See id.
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297

court. Beyond Congressional intervention, the courts have the
ability to ensure that the spirit and intent of citizen suits is
maintained, and that the important goal of guaranteeing
environmental compliance is met. Courts, when faced with a citizen
suit where the government has not acted to the citizen litigant’s
satisfaction, should provide citizens the ability to file successive
actions if the government’s prosecution does not require compliance,
is too dilatory, or is completely inadequate.
5. State Preemption of Citizen Suits
Uncertainty over the definition of diligence and absolute
deference to the government’s “plan of attack” are most problematic
for the future effectiveness of citizen suits when the government
preempts the citizen suit for reasons beyond environmental
protection. The notice provisions show that agencies were intended
to be primary enforcers. The intervening 60 days prior to the citizen
filing its suit is meant to provide the government with the “first bite at
the apple” of enforcing environmental law. But the provisions are
not meant as an opportunity for the state to preempt the enforcement
by the citizens to the detriment of environmental protection and
public participation.
As David Hodas has explained, several states have adopted this
preclusion approach—in practice if not in explicit words—as a way to
298
avoid liability.
Environmental groups such as Chesapeake Bay
Foundation and Natural Resources Defense Council have been
299
victims of collusion between states and polluters. The result of the
preemption has routinely been more lenient sanctions on the polluter
300
than the citizen action had demanded.
The basis for some of the preemption of citizen suits is to protect
301
local industries.
It has long been believed by some that
environmental enforcement stymies economic growth, and has been
the battle-cry of some business groups and lawmakers. In these lean
economic times, these arguments have become louder and have
surfaced in the form of regulatory reform initiatives such as those
discussed in Part II. Collusive state preemption of citizen suits will
only increase as long as lawmakers and policymakers feel that the
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.

We address Congressional intervention to clarify and remove barriers in Part IV, infra.
See Hodas, supra note 300, 1648–49.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1650.
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duty of the state to attract business is mutually exclusive from and in
overt opposition to the duty to protect environmental health.
IV. THE CALL TO CONGRESS TO PROTECT AND PRESERVE
ENVIRONMENTAL CITIZEN SUITS
This article has argued that citizen enforcement is the vital third
leg of the cooperative federalist regime of environmental
enforcement. We have also explained why citizen enforcement is
especially necessary when economic distress affects both public and
private sectors. We have also discussed how courts have created
barriers that impede the full, vigorous citizen enforcement of
environmental laws that Congress intended—and that has proven
necessary today.
In this final section, we propose legislative solutions that will
maximize the efficacy of supplemental citizen litigation, allowing
citizen litigants to act as the “citizen attorneys general” that Congress
envisioned. These legislative solutions will address the four major
court-created issues that act as either disincentives or outright
barriers to citizen litigation. The solutions we propose take the form
of legislation—a model act—that will address the major impediments
to full citizen participation in environmental enforcement.
A. The “Omnibus Environmental Enforcement Act”
Congress giveth citizen suits, the courts taketh away, and now it
is imperative that Congress step in once more to make sure that
federal citizen suits are able to pick up the slack for the failure of
cooperative federalism. The solution to these problems is decisive
th
action by the 111 Congress to pass an “Omnibus Environmental
Enforcement Act” (“the Act”) as a means to facilitate public
enforcement of environmental laws. The Act would be codified most
appropriately as additional provisions of the National Environmental
302
Policy Act (NEPA), divided into three sections as explained below.
B. Section One: Congressional Findings
The Act would initially begin with a list of Congressional findings
to stand as a backdrop explaining why Congress chose to act in the

302. The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (“NEPA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4347
(2000), was one of the first laws ever written that establishes the broad national framework for
protecting our environment, and therefore appropriate for a broad reaching citizen suit
provision stylized for the same purpose.
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1970s and why it must act again. The findings clause would: 1)
reiterate the Congressional intent of the original environmental
citizen suits as a means to provide more and better enforcement of
environmental and human health protections; 2) find that courts have
misread legislative histories and misinterpreted many citizen suit
provisions; and 3) state that human and financial resource scarcity in
federal and state government agencies make it imperative that
citizens be given full power to step in the shoes of governmental
regulators to enforce Congress’ important environmental mandates.
C. Section Two: Essential Framework of Citizen Suits
The Act would then rescind all current federal environmental
citizen suits and replace them with one centralized citizen suit
provision that governs all federal environmental protection laws. The
303
provisions in all acts are all substantially similar.
The minor
differences in the processes of citizen enforcement from one
environmental statute to the next are unnecessary, and only
contribute to further eroding of citizen enforcement potential. There
have been no viable arguments that the process for citizen
enforcement of CWA, SMCRA, or CAA, or any of the other score of
environmental laws must be dissimilar from each other or dissimilar
304
than the enforcement processes of the federal government.
The Act would maintain much of the CAA’s enforcement
structure, including the notice, delay, and venue provisions of current
citizen suits. The Act would also preserve the enforcement rights of
agency heads. The Act would permit a citizen to sue a member of the
regulated community for a violation of a standard or limitation or the
state or federal government for not enforcing Congressional
mandates under one of the enumerated statutes. However, the
barriers that have intentionally or otherwise been erected by states or
courts to keep citizen suits out of court must be eliminated.
D. Section Three: Eliminating Procedural Barriers
The final section would act as a clarifying provision that would
address each of the major court-created barriers to citizen litigation
that we outline in Part III. The suggestions we propose would allow
citizen litigants the flexibility to effectively enforce federal

303. See supra note 7.
304. For example, one model citizen suit provision could eliminate the differences in the
various fee-shifting provisions. See infra Part III.A.
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environmental laws by providing incentives and reducing barriers to
their litigation.
1. Clarifying Attorneys’ Fees Clauses
First, the provision would provide clear parameters for the
recovery of attorneys’ fees following a suit. Congress recognized and
intended the fee-shifting provisions in the CAA and other
environmental statutes to act as a statutory exception to the
305
American rule.
Congress can resolve the ambiguity created by
306
In
Ruckelshaus by defining the phrase “whenever appropriate.”
this definition, the Act would explicitly permit courts to allow
unsuccessful plaintiffs who “serve the public interest” to receive
appropriate fees.
The provision should also explicitly not allow courts to grant
attorneys’ fees to defendants when a plaintiff, if unsuccessful, brings
an otherwise colorable claim. Admittedly, some would counter this
with the argument that explicit disapproval of fee shifting for the
defendant would lead to unheeded citizen suits over every state
action and every environmental permitee, thus deadlocking the courts
and keeping state officials from actively enforcing environmental
307
laws. However, under Rule 11 sanctions and other frivolous law
308
suit standards, courts still will be able to keep such frivolous suits
out of the federal judicial system.
2. Defining “Diligent Prosecution”
The Act would clarify the ambiguities concerning diligent
309
prosecution. The currently undefined term “diligent” would be
defined temporally by applying six to twelve month transparency
benchmarks during which the agency must keep the citizen who filed
the notice informed of its prosecution. Also, “diligent” would be
defined qualitatively, by stating that the prosecution shall be one that
is calculated to lead to compliance and deter future violations.

305. “[C]ongress meant something more by the provision in the Clean Air Act: it intended
to encourage the participation of ‘public interest’ groups in resolving complex technical
questions and important and difficult questions of statutory interpretation, and in monitoring
the prompt implementation of the Act.” Gorsuch, 672 F.2d at 38.
306. See infra Part III. A.
307. Federal Rule 11(b) allows for sanctions when a suit or pleading is brought for an
“improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of
litigation.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(1).
308. See supra note 178.
309. See discussion at supra note 56.
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Theoretically, this would require judgment on whether a settled
sanction between the violator and the government was stringent
enough for both specific and general deterrence of that violation, thus
both limiting the need for future governmental or citizen enforcement
actions.
The Act would specifically provide for successive citizen suits
when governmental enforcement has been ineffective or inadequate;
and it would task the courts to determine the adequacy of
governmental enforcement based on whether the outcome has or
would lead to compliance. Also, it would expressly allow for
successive citizen suits if the governmental prosecution did not cover
all allegations of the citizen suit notice. Finally, this provision would
address collusive or dilatory preclusion by states by requiring the
precluding agency or defendant to shoulder the burden of proving
that the governmental prosecution was diligent and was calculated to
require compliance.
3. Reaffirming the Citizen Attorney General Concept
This section would first address citizen standing by creating a
new standing paradigm for environmental plaintiffs, one allowing
them to act as true “citizen attorneys general.” As we described in
Part III, standing remains the fundamental barrier to citizen
enforcement of environmental laws, a barrier that prevents the full
realization of the citizen attorney concept.
First, Congress can include language in a new act such as ours to
reaffirm both its intent and its power to confer a cause of action and
create a generalized grievance. This could be accomplished with
simple language that expands upon the attempted grant of universal
standing in each of the environmental statutes. The environmental
statutes provide that “any person” may sue to enforce the acts, yet the
Court has not recognized this language as a grant of universal
310
standing.
Congress should unequivocally assert its intention to
confer a cause of action to all citizens as a way to ensure that their
environmental laws are complied with.
An additional device to ensure standing, first proposed by Cass
311
Sunstein, would be the inclusion of cash bounties.
For example,
Congress could allow successful citizen litigants to obtain modest cash
prizes, perhaps a few hundred up to a few thousand dollars, in
addition to litigation expenses. Citizens would then have a direct
310. CAA § 304(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (2006).
311. Sunstein, supra note 183, at 232.
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interest and a concrete stake in the outcome of the litigation: win and
they make money.
At the very least, our suggestions would force the Supreme
Court to focus squarely on Congress’ constitutional power to confer
such a cause of action to citizens. The novel language we suggest
would no doubt be challenged and would almost certainly reach the
Court. But such a challenge would provide an opportunity for the
Court to move beyond the narrow analysis of the sufficiency of
injuries in fact. The Court could move instead to the more
fundamental question of whether Congress has the power to convey
universal standing to citizen plaintiffs.
4. Eleventh Amendment
Finally, the Act would affirm that state regulations pursuant to
federal laws shall remain federal laws. This clarification would ensure
that the Eleventh Amendment does not immunize state officials from
citizen suits. As stated previously, it is imperative that citizens be
allowed to stand in the shoes of the federal government when
enforcing environmental mandates in suits against both private
individuals and the government itself. Just as the federal government
can take action against a state to require adherence to federal
mandates, so shall citizens.
In fact, the proposed provision should implicitly reference the Ex
parte Young doctrine as the basis for citizen enforcement of federal
standards against state officials as an exception to sovereign
312
immunity. The proposed provision would maintain the language in
current citizen suits that a citizen may bring suit against governmental
instrumentality or agency “to the extent permitted by the Eleventh
313
Amendment.” However, it would clarify the phrase “to the extent
permitted by the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution” by
permitting citizens of a state to file suit against its state or state
agency or official for not enforcing; conforming its regulations to; or
otherwise abiding to the federal minimum standards or limitations of
the enumerated environmental laws covered by the Act.

312. The provision may state that “a federal court can issue prospective injunctive and
declaratory relief compelling a state official to comply with federal law.” See S&M Brands v.
Cooper, 527 F.3d 500, 507 (6th Cir. 2008).
313. “[A]ny citizen may commence a civil action on his own behalf against . . . any
governmental instrumentality or agency to the extent permitted by the eleventh amendment.”
See CWA § 505(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1) (2006).
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CONCLUSION
The idea for this article was borne from our simple belief that
environmental laws should be vigorously enforced to be effective. By
including citizen suit provisions in nearly every environmental statute
enacted since the 1970s, Congress has demonstrated that it, too,
shares our belief. These provisions act as an insurance policy, as a
way to ensure that environmental laws can be enforced even when
state and federal governments fail to do so. Indeed, the legislative
histories behind these acts show that Congress did not want an
ineffective, or broken, enforcement model to impede natural resource
protection.
As we have explained, the cooperative federalist enforcement
model has proven ineffective on many levels, resulting in unenforced
laws.
Each flaw in this model, moreover, is created by or
compounded by political resistance to regulation and tightening state
agency budgets. Citizen enforcement, therefore, is increasingly
necessary. It is true that “the citizen suit is meant to supplement
314
rather than to supplant governmental action.” But the citizen suit
should not itself be supplanted by procedural obstacles. The four
major legal barriers we have described that hamper citizen access to
the courts are significant but not insurmountable. The effect of these
barriers is to alter Congress’s grant of citizen standing, preventing
public interest groups like ours from enforcing national standards.
But relatively simple legislative changes, such as the ones we have
described, will allow Congress to reassert its intention and power to
convey citizens’ broad enforcement powers.

314. Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, 484 U.S. 49, 60 (1987).

